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SALVAGING THE WRECKAGE: MULTIDISTRICT
LITIGATION AND AVIATION
KYLE BRACKIN

I.

INTRODUCTION

N DECEMBER 23, 1987, television cameras graphically captured the spine chilling screams and sobs of a
mother who had just learned of her child's death aboard
Pan Am Flight 103.' But the American media cannot as
easily recreate the silent screams and headaches caused by
the complex legal process which confronts airline accident victims and their families who attempt to gain compensation for their loss. 2 The mother's hysterical reaction
to an airplane crash is understandable; the sudden and
unexpected nature of airline accidents and the high percentage of fatalities provoke tremendous pain, grief, and
sorrow.3 The aggravation that the legal system adds to
I CBS Evening News (CBS television broadcast, Dec. 23, 1988); Dennis Hevesi,
Thirty-six Students at Syracuse Among the Passengers,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1988, at A16
(woman screaming atJFK Airport in New York on notification of daughter's death
aboard Pan Am flight 103).
2 Trials and appeals of airline accident litigation consume years of court time.
For example, appeals were still before the courts as late as 1991 in the Delta crash
at Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport which occurred August 2, 1985. In Re
Air Crash at D/FW Airport, 919 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom.,
Connors v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 622 (1991). See also In Re Air Crash in Bali,
Indonesia, 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982) (multiple passenger appeals still in dispute eight years after crash). Of course, these particular cases do not represent all
of the suits brought by victims of these accidents. The litigation process might be
longer or shorter depending on compensation sought by the victim and his/her
willingness to settle.
I Airline accidents are statistically uncommon occurrences. Decline in Aviation
Acddents, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Jan. 19, 1991, at A19. Unfortunately, when an
airline accident does happen the percentage of passengers killed is great and the
degree of injury to those who survive is severe. But the danger of airline accidents
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the airline accident victim's trauma is unconscionable.
When a plane falls from the sky, the passengers are not at
fault; they or their families deserve full and swift compensation for their injuries. Unfortunately, the legal system
seemingly aggravates their trauma.
The present aviation tort system creates inflated transaction costs and strains judicial resources.4 The system
alienates the public trust when airline accident victims
must wait for years for the courts to finally award damages. 5 The overall unpredictability and wide range of
compensation available for victims further erodes any expectation the public might retain that justice, though
slow, eventually will be served. 6 The high price of litigation also contributes to the already tight margins of the
must be kept in perspective. Each year car accidents kill thousands on the highways. See BRANCH, FRY & LEBECK, Litigating Hazardous Highway Claims, vii (1990)
(Federal Highway Administration reported 46,056 fatalities and 3.4 million injuries on United States roads in 1986). In 1981, motor vehicle crashes were the
leading cause of death for people under age 50. Joan Claybrook, Vehicle Safety
Research: Alive and Well, TRIAL, Jan. 1981, at 35. The vast majority of those in-

volved in auto accidents, though, do not die and, generally, car accidents do not
kill hundreds of persons in one accident.
Inflated transaction costs of the current aviation accident litigation scheme
squeeze both plaintiffs and defendants. Airlines pay from $3500 to $17,000 per
victim in legal fees. Contingency fees paid to attorneys significantly reduce compensation paid to victims or their families as well. Randal R. Craft, Jr., Factors
Influencing Settlement of Personal Injury and Death Claims in Aircraft Accident Litigation,
46J. AIR L. & CoM. 895, 897 n.4 (1981).

Crowded dockets in the federal courts are a matter of record. "On June 30,
1980, the pending backlog [in the Eastern District of New York] totalled 447 cases
per authorized judgeship." John R. Bartels, Recent Expansion in FederalJurisdiction:
A Callfor Restraint, 55 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 219, 222 (1981). Civil filings increased
190% in the Southern District of New York from 1970 to 1980. Id. Overall, in the
federal court system, pending cases in United States District Courts increased
from 93,000 to 190,000 in the same decade. Id. at 237. The federal jurisdictional
expansion has occurred through courts granting habeas corpus and civil rights
litigation imposed by Congress and judicial expansion of constitutional rights.
James C. Hill & Thomas E. Baker, Dam FederalJurisdiction!,32 EMORY L.J. 3, 76-77
(1983).
5

Georgia Sargeant, ABA Rejects First Proposed Mass Tort Consolidated Plan: Second

Plan Withdrawn, TRIAL, Apr. 1990, at 14, 16 (citing Robert Hanley, Chairman of
the ABA Commission on Mass Torts, "[pleople won't stand for having to wait five
years to get to trial.").
,i Wide ranges exist in compensation given to individual plaintiffs depending on
the law applied to the individual claim by the court and the jury verdict. See infra
notes 77-93 and accompanying text. See also Robert W. Kastenmeier & Charles G.
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airline industry. 7 Judges8 and commentators 9 universally
agree that the current mass aviation tort litigation process
must change.
This article examines the problems which exist within
the mass aviation torts arena, and it searches for potential
solutions. A short foray into the overall problems of mass
tort litigation challenging the American legal system sets
the stage for the discussion. Next follows an in-depth
look at the adaption of multidistrict litigation in the federal courts to cope with mass aviation accidents. This investigation exposes particular friction areas in that
relationship. Using the knowledge gained from that perGeyh, The Case In Support of Legislation Facilitatingthe Consolidation of Mass-Accident
Litigation:A View From The Legislature, 73 MARQUETTE L. REV. 535, 551 (1990).
7 The airline industry is reeling from the effects of deregulation and the double
backlash of the Gulf War: higher fuel prices and reduction in travel due to fear of
terrorist activity. Paul S. Dempsey, The Sky Ought To Be The Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
26, 1991, at Y19. Many airlines are either in bankruptcy or close to the edge. See

Edward H. Kolcum, Airline Mainstay Eastern Stops Flying After 62 Years, Av. WK. &
SPACE TECH., Jan. 28, 1991, at 65; Agis Salpukas, Bankruptcy Filing Entered By
T. W.A.; Flights Continue, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1992, at I (timeline notes four major

airlines are currently operating in bankruptcy: T.W.A., American West, Continental and Midway). James Ott, Anthony Velocci, Jr., Unability to Adapt in New Era of
Aviation Doomed Pan Am, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Dec. 16-23, 1991, at 28 (Pan Am

World Airways ceases operations after 64 years in December 1991). Even those
airlines considered healthy experienced severe financial losses during the last part
of 1990. Terry Maxon, Delta's Loss Sets Record, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 24,

1991, at DI (Delta's loss in final quarter 1990 was four times worse than previous
company loss. American Airlines also lost $215.1 million during the same
period).
644 F.2d 594, 633 (7th Cir.) [hereIn re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill.,
inafter Chicago], cert. denied sub nom., Lin v. American Airlines, Inc., 454 U.S. 878
(1981); Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied sub nom., Forth Corp. v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 421 U.S. 978 (1975); In re
Air Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport, 750 F. Supp. 793, 814 (E.D. Mich 1989)
[hereinafter Detroit]; In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l Airport, Denver,
Colo., 720 F. Supp. 1445, 1454 (D. Colo. 1988) [hereinafter Denver I]; In re Air
Crash at Washington, D.C., 559 F. Supp. 333, 335-36 (D.D.C. 1983) [hereinafter
D.C.].

" Willis L. M. Reese, The Law Governing Airplane Accidents, 39

WASH.

&

LEE

L.

REV. 1303 (1982); Russell P. Veldenz, Comment, Aviation Tort Liability: The Need
ForA Comprehensive FederalAviation Liability Act, 15J. MARSHALL L. REV. 177, 17884, 211 (1982); John H. Lowrie, Note, Air Crash Litigation and 28 U.S.C. Section
1407: Experience Suggests a Solution, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 927, 928 (1981); Note, The
Case For A Federal Common Law Of Aircraft Disaster Litig: A Judicial Solution To A National Problem, 51 N.Y.U.L. REV. 231, 232 (1976).

658

JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE

[57

spective, a plan for revising aviation disaster litigation will
be proposed.
A.

The Evolution of the Current System

The hopelessly tangled legal wreckage of mass aviation
torts reflects a larger problem within American tort law:
the inability of our court system to effectively resolve
large scale, complex lawsuits. Mass torts resulting from
mass disasters,' 0 asbestos cases,"1 and toxic torts 2 overwhelm the capacity of the courts to handle their caseloads
adequately or efficiently. As American society in the nineties emerges wrapped in fiber optic wires, a tortfeasor's
ability to injure has grown astronomically in terms of the
- See generally, In re Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 907 F.2d 4 (1st Cir.
1990) (four years after fire, multidistrict litigation continues); Hydro-Air Equipment, Inc. v. Hyatt Corp., 852 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1988) (eight years after the fire
in Las Vegas' MGM Grand Hotel, in one of the most "efficiently handled multidistrict litigation cases ever," litigation continues); In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 695
F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom., Bryant Elec. Co. v. Kiser, 461 U.S.
929 (1983) (fast-spreading fire in Louisville, Kentucky supper club injuring hundreds, litigation continues three years afterward); In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680
F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Stover v. Rau, 459 U.S. 988 (1982) (a
year after Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel ramp collapsed killing 114 and injuring hundreds more, preliminary trial court rulings certifying class action for victims was struck down, sending cases back to trial court for individual
adjudication).
I See generally In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 707, 712 (5th Cir. 1990)
(court recognizes significance of and need for innovation in dealing with the asbestos caseload within the circuit); Cimino v. Raymark Indus. Inc., 751 F. Supp.
649, 650-52 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (opinion includes history of one district court's
grappling with an enormous number of asbestos cases).
For discussion of the asbestos problem by commentators see Bert Rein &
Thomas Kirby, Is There A Way Out of the Asbestos Mess?, TEXAS LAw., Oct. 1, 1990, at
22; Deborah R. Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989 U. ILL.
L. REV. 89 (1989); Russell J. Weintraub, Methods for Resolving Conflict-of-Laws
Problems in Mass Tort Litigation, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 129 (1989).
Claims against asbestos manufacturers have already resulted in the
filing of more than 30,000 suits, cases are being filed at the rate of
about 500 a month, and this is merely the tip of the asbestos iceberg.
Since 1940, approximately twenty-one million workers have been
exposed in the United States to significant amounts of asbestos.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
12 See generally In Re Benedictin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 293-96 (6th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989); In re Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d
847, 849-50 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983); In Re "Agent Orange" Product Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690, 692 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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number of persons affected and the degree of possible
harm.' 3 Common law traditions such as the two-party, adversarial dispute resolution mechanism inhibit any mul4
tiparty, global resolution of mass tort cases.'
Through the years, the American legal system has responded to problems created by mass torts. The response, however, has not been adequate in terms of speed
or forcefulness. In 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) provided the courts with the first important
tool for simplification of complex disputes.' 5 The FRCP
provided federal courts with a limited ability to dispose of
related cases simultaneously. The Supreme Court's decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, also in 1938, mandated
that a federal court must apply the law of the state in
which it is located to cases arising out of diversity jurisdiction.16 Thirty years later, in 1968, the Multidistrict Litigation Act (MLA) allowed federal courts to combine cases
See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
,4See Stephen C. Yeazell, Collective Litigation As Collective Action, 1989 U. ILL. L.
'-1

REV.

43, 47-48 (1989):
The adversarial system, reinforced by an entrepreneurial professional ethos, by doctrines of due process, by the significant role of
market capitalism in the economy, by a political ideology of individual rights, and by almost a millennium of acculturation to individualist litigation practices has created a strongly individualistic system of
litigation.

Id.

1.5
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Order of December 20, 1937, 302 U.S. 783
(Supreme Court sends new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to Attorney General
to report them to Congress); Act of June 19, 1934, Ch. 651, § 2, 48 Stat. 1064
(1934):
The [Supreme] [Clourt may at any time unite the general rules prescribed by it for cases in equity with those in actions at law so as to
secure one form of civil action and procedure for both . . .Such

united rules shall not take effect until they shall have been reported
to Congress by the Attorney General at the beginning of a regular
session thereof and until after the close of such session.
Id.

304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). The Erie doctrine, as the body of law arising out of
this case is known, held that federal courts must apply the law of the jurisdiction
in which it is located to diversity cases. Id.The decision overturned Swift v. Tyson,
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842), which held that federal diversity courts were not
bound to apply the case law of their state, but were free to exercise independent
judgment as to what the common law should be. Erie, 304 U.S. at 77-8. Specifically, the Swift court ruled that the word "laws" as defined in the Rules of Decision
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arising out of common questions of fact or law into one
district court for discovery purposes.17 These desperately
needed substantive and procedural adjustments to American law define the present framework for mass disaster litigation within the federal courts.
The substantive and procedural adjustments, considered radical at the time, faded into the stasis now frustrating the federal courts in the 1990s. The federal court
system cries out for new procedural devices to effectively
manage a huge docket including mass torts. The substantive superstructure of the law must adapt as well. Substantive changes in the law devised with new implementation
schemes would greatly improve the courts' ability to function. The courts and Congress should examine the present procedural and substantive underpinnings of mass
torts and take action to address these issues. Scholars and
students should bring new ideas and concepts to the attention of the judiciary and the legislature as well.
When a tort harms a large number of persons, the common law model envisions each victim filing an individual
action against the tortfeasor(s) allegedly responsible.'"
Hundreds of civil claims could potentially arise out of the
Act, now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988) meant only state statutes. Swift, 41
U.S. at 18.
From the time the Supreme Court handed down the Erie decision, federal
courts were bound to apply the law of the states as the state supreme court would
interpret it. Ultimately, as the federal courts fleshed out the Erie doctrine, they
came to rely on state law for choice of law methods and many other important
aspects of legal decisionmaking. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S.
487, 496 (1941) (state choice of law rules must be applied by federal diversity
courts).
17 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988).
,8 See supra note 12; see also Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282-83 (1976).
In our received tradition the lawsuit is a vehicle for settling disputes
between private parties about private rights. The defining features
of this conception of civil adjudication are: (1) the lawsuit is bipolar,
(2) litigation is retrospective, (3) right and remedy are interdependent, (4) the lawsuit is a self-contained episode, (5) the process is
party-initiated and party-controlled.
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same set of circumstances.' 9 Since the Rules encourage
cross-claims, counterclaims and interventions in civil
suits, the number of individual claims could soar even
higher.2 0 The sheer number of claims and the limited judicial resources available dictate that individual adjudication of each claimant's suit in a mass tort case is
impossible and undesirable. 2 ' Furthermore, even if separate trials were plausible, each individual case would be
repetitive. In mass tort suits, the identical witnesses, evidence, testimony and pleadings form the backbone of
most related cases.22
The FRCP remedy this situation slightly. Rules 19, 20
and 24 allow joinder and intervention of parties with related interests in civil suits upon a showing of a right or at
the discretion of the judge.23 FRCP 42 allows cases filed
in the same federal district court to be consolidated for
"' MARCUS & SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION 6 (1985).

Lowrie, supra note 9, at 927.

21"

Id.

Modern commercial aircraft carry hundreds of individuals, and each
person on board represents a potential plaintiff if an accident occurs.
Moreover, an aviation disaster commonly involves numerous defendants. Plaintiffs almost always name the airline as defendant, citing pilot error or faulty maintenance, and plaintiffs typically sue the
plane's manufacturer regarding the aircraft design. These two defendants, in turn, frequently join the manufacturers of myriad component parts, such as altimeters, warning devices, landing gear, or
engine bolts, any of which might contribute to a particular crash.
Other potential defendants include airports and the United States
government.

I2Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 651-52 (E.D. Tex 1990).
"Four hundred and forty-eight [victims] have died waiting for their (asbestos)
cases to be heard .... If the Court could somehow close thirty cases a month, it
would take six and one-half years to try these cases and there would be pending
over 5000 untouched cases at the present rate of filing." Id.
22 See Marcus & Sherman, supra note 19, at 6; In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l Airport, Denver, Colo., 720 F. Supp. 1455, 1459 (D. Colo. 1988) [hereinafter Denver II]. The court noted specifically that liability phases of individual
trials would involve identical evidence and standards of conduct in the airplane
crash cases on its docket. For that reason, the court conducted an exemplar consolidated trial. The results of the exemplar trial would bind all cases consolidated
in the District of Colorado at that time by the JPML. Denver 11, 720 F. Supp. at
1459.
2'- FED. R. Civ. P. 19. Parties who are necessary and/or indispensable to
a just
adjudication of the issues before the court are to be joined by the court or the
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pretrial proceedings or for trial. 24 FRCP 13 mandates
that parties with related or other claims against another
party must or may raise these claims in the same forum.25
FRCP 14 permits parties to implead third parties into
cases for efficiency purposes as well as other reasons.26
Overall, the range, and thus the usefulness, of the gathering mechanisms of the FRCP is limited to suits filed in the
same federal district court.
Certain transfer provisions in the United States Code,
which Congress enacted shortly after the FRCP became
effective, also aided the federal courts' ability to consolidate cases. Section 1404(a) allows federal judges to transparties. Id. If a person needed for a just adjudication cannot be joined, section
(b) of Rule 19 allows the court to dismiss the case. Id. at (b).
FED. R. Civ. P. 20. Rule 20 affects parties with an interest which does not reach
the threshold level of indispensable or necessary in the issues before the court.
Id. Rule 20 gives the judge discretion to permit such a party to join the action. Id.
FED. R. Civ. P. 24. Rule 24 delineates the scope of intervention as a right in
section (a) and permissive intervention in section (b). Id. Rule 24(a) demands a
showing by the intervening party that his interests will be prejudiced as a practical
matter unless the court allows him to represent himself in the action before the
court. Id. at (a). Rule 24(b) essentially allows intervention at the judge's discretion. Id. at (b).
21 FED. R. Civ. P. 42. When parties file suits with common questions of fact
within the same federal district court, the court may order joint hearings or consolidate the cases for discovery or other pretrial matters. Id. at (a). A court may
consolidate related cases that are filed in the same district court. Id. This rule
also permits bifurcation of trials: separate trials for different parts of the same
suits. Id. at (b).
2
FED. R. Civ. P. 13. If a party possesses related claims which could or should
have been adjudicated with an original suit, federal courts may bar later suits on
those claims. Id. This federal court policy is especially rigid if the parties against
whom the related claims are brought were under the court's jurisdiction in the
initial proceedings.
2,i FED. R. Civ. P. 14. This rule is aimed at allowing defendants the right to
bring in all parties who may have been joint tortfeasors or have indemnity obligations into court. Plaintiffs receive coextensive rights to bring in third parties. Id.
at (b). The main limitation on third parties being brought into court in this manner is the complete diversity jurisdictional requirement. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)
(1988). See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch.) 267 (1806) (Supreme
Court's judicial gloss on diversity statute mandates that every plaintiff must be
completely diverse from every defendant). If a plaintiff brings in a third party,
thereby destroying complete diversity, the court must dismiss the case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, if no other basis for jurisdiction exists. See, e.g., Owen
Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978) (widow cross-claimed
against third party defendant unwittingly destroying diversity).
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fer a civil action to any other federal district court or
division in which the suit originally could have been
brought. 2 ' A section 1401(a) transfer requires ajudge to
find that the transfer serves either the convenience of the
parties and witnesses or the interest ofjustice.28 Section
1406 provides federal courts with the ability to transfer
cases lacking venue into a district or division with proper
29

venue.

From an institutional perspective, these statutes authorize the federal courts to transfer cases to a more logical
forum. Unfortunately, Congress conferred this ability on
the judiciary without any accompanying power of coercion or coordination.3 0 For instance, even if the Northern
District of Texas appeared to provide the most logical and
convenient forum for litigation surrounding an airplane
crash at D/FW Airport, federal judges overseeing cases
filed in their respective districts would retain complete
discretion over any transfer decision. The likelihood of
numerous judges from diverse districts individually deciding on the same district as the best place for adjudication
of a case is extremely slim. The system clearly required
further refinement beyond the FRCP to make the transfer
mechanism more useful and efficient.
In 1968, Congress ratified the MLA and conferred upon
the federal judiciary the coordinating body and requisite
authority for effective transfer and consolidation . 3 The
21 The statute reads, "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
28 Id.
2s, The statute reads, "The district court of a district in which is filed a case
laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have
been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (1988).

-11See 114 CONG. REC. 9435 (1968); Lowrie, supra note 9, at 945-46; Veldenz, supra

note 9, at 187-88.
- Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-296, 82 Stat. 109 (1968)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988)). The key section of the statute
reads as follows:
(a) [W]hen civil action involving one or more common questions of
fact are pending in different districts, such actions may be trans-
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plethora of antitrust actions filed against the electrical
equipment industry in the early 1960s prodded Congress
to finally address the reality of mass, complex litigation. 2
The electric equipment litigation, along with other cases,
focused attention on the federal judicial system's inability
to draw related cases to a single forum. The MLA therefore sired the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
(JPML).
Congress granted to this new body the power to transfer civil actions filed in different districts, and having one
or more common questions of fact, to any federal district
court for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. In the twenty-two years since the MLA became law,
the JPML has utilized its multidistrict transfer capacity in
such areas as antitrust, 34 products liability, 35 and mass disasters.3 6 Multidistrict litigation is particularly well-suited
for the needs of airline crash litigation. Because of its
ferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such transfers shall be made by the judicial panel on
multidistrict litigation authorized by this section upon its determination that transfers for such proceedings will be for the convenience
of parties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions. Each action so transferred shall be remanded
by the panel at or from which it was transferred unless it shall have
been previously terminated. Provided, however, That the panel may
separate any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim
and remand any of such claims before the remainder of the action is
remanded.
(emphasis in original) Id.
12 See Marcus & Sherman, supra note 19, at 211; Stanley A. Weigel, The Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation: Transferor Courts and Transferee Courts, 78 F.R.D. 575,
581 (1977); Kastenmeier & Geyh, supra note 6, at 547.
28 U.S.C. § 1407(d) (1988).
The panel on multidistrict litigation shall consist of seven circuit and
district judges designated from time to time by the Chief Justice of
the United States, no two of whom shall be from the same circuit.
The concurrence of four members shall be necessary to any action
by the panel.
Id.
See, e.g., In Re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litig., 471 F. Supp. 754 (S.D. Fla.
1979); In re Milk Monopolization Litig., 386 F. Supp. 1401 (J.P.M.L. 1975); In re
Plumbing Fixtures Litig., 342 F. Supp. 756 (J.P.M.L. 1972).
'
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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widespread use in airline crash litigation, the specific provisions of the MLA and its practical application merit
close examination.
B.

The Multidistrict Litigation Statute

Any party of the JPML may initiate the transfer of an
action under the MLA.3 7 The JPML bases its transfer decisions upon a record of a hearing at which any party may
present material evidence.3 8 The transfer decision must

be supported by findings of fact and conclusions of law
39
arrived at by the JPML from the record of the hearing.
The sole possibility for review of a JPML transfer decision
is a party's submission of an extraordinary writ petition,
pursuant to the All Writs Act, 40 to the circuit court of ap-

peals exercising jurisdiction over the court in which the
transfer hearing is to be or has been held. 4 '
Once the transfer ruling has been made, the JPML may
designate a judge or judges to preside over the pretrial
proceedings in the case.42 The JPML may request the
ChiefJustice of the United States or the chiefjudge of the
circuit to appoint a district judge to serve in the transferee
district court to conduct the consolidated pretrial proceedings. 43 The JPML more commonly assigns, with the
28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1988).
18 Section 1407(c) reads in pertinent part:
[T]he panel's order of transfer shall be based upon a record of such
hearing at which material evidence may be offered by any party to an
action pending in any district that would be affected by the proceedings under this section, and shall be supported by findings of fact
and conclusions of law based upon such record ....
28 U.S.C. § 1407(c) (1988).
.7

11

Id.

4o 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1988).
(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of
law. (b) An alternative writ or rule nisi may be issued by a justice or
judge of a court which has jurisdiction.
Id.
4'

4

28 U.S.C. § 1407(e) (1988).
28 U.S.C. § 1407(b) (1988).

4' /d.
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permission of the transferee court, the transferred cases
for pretrial proceedings to a judge of the transferee
court.4 4 The JPML's power includes the authority to transfer or sever all or any part of a civil case from the transfer
order.45 Furthermore, the statute commands that all
cases transferred for pretrial proceedings shall be remanded back to the transferor court after the close of the
pretrial proceedings. The only exception to that rule is
the action's termination in the transferee court.4 6 Finally,
the statute empowers the JPML to prescribe rules that
govern the conduct of its deliberations.4 7
The Rules, adopted in 1988, provide detailed guidance
to parties whose cases come before the JPML.48 While
many of the Rules contain technical information about filing motions and papers with the panel,4 9 certain Rules can
significantly affect the substantive outcome of a case.
These important directives require careful review.
The time necessary for completion of a JPML transfer
action can be extremely short. Rule 11 states that when
theJPML considers transfer of a case on its own initiative,
the JPML will enter an order with the clerk of the JPML
directing the parties to show cause why the action should
not be transferred.5 0 The parties' discretionary response
to this show cause order must be filed within twenty days,
otherwise the JPML assumes a party's acquiescence to the
transfer. 5 ' Rule 11 (a) also requires that parties shall notify the clerk of theJPML of any other existing federal district court actions related to the litigation at issue before
the JPML. This duty to report includes all related federal
44

4.
46

Id.
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
Id.

47 Section 1407(f) provides, "The panel may prescribe rules for the conduct of
its business not inconsistent with Acts of Congress and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedures." 28 U.S.C. § 1407(f) (1988).
41 Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Note following 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988) (adopted June 14, 1988) [hereinafter Rules].
49 Id. Rules 2-10 provide general guidelines for theJPML.
Rule 11 (a), Note following 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988).
Id. at ll(b).
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actions which a party may file in the future.52 Rule 13
mandates that counsel to any party in a transferred case
must notify the JPML of any other related action or tagalong action in which his client appears or in which he
serves as counsel. 53 Rule 1 defines a tag-along action as
"a civil action pending in a district court and involving
common questions of
fact with actions previously trans54
ferred under 1407."
The clerk of the JPML, pursuant to Rule 12, can enter
an order conditionally transferring any potential tagalong actions to the previous transferee district on the basis of prior decisions of the JPML.55 After notification of
the parties, the clerk will transmit the transfer order for
the tag-along action if a notice of opposition to the conditional transfer order has not been filed within fifteen
days. 56 A party opposing the transfer must then file a motion to vacate the conditional transfer order and a brief in
support thereof with the JPML clerk. 57 Recognizing the
court's general power regarding consolidation, Rule 13
allows consolidation of tag-along actions filed in the
transferee district with even less process and no action of
the JPML.58 A party's request for consolidation of these
tag-along actions should be made according to the local
rules of the transferee district court. 59 The federal procedural mechanics codified by the Rules for multidistrict litigation both transfer and consolidate related actions
speedily with or without the assent of the litigants.
Rule 14 governs the termination and remand of cases
that have been transferred under the MLA to a transferee
court after pretrial proceedings end. 60 Actions which the
Id. at 1 (a).
-" Rule 13(e), Note following 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988).
5
Rule 1, Note following 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988).
Rule 12(a), Note following 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988).
Id. at 12(c).
.'2

.7

Id. at 12(d).

-' Rule 13(a), Note following 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988).
.11Id.
',, Rule 14, Note following 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988).
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transferee court disposes of by summary judgment, judgment of dismissal with prejudice, or upon stipulation of
the parties after settlement obviously do not require remand. 6 ' In fact, most of the cases transferred by the
JPML terminate this way.62 Remand from the transferee
court back to the transferor court occurs only rarely.63
Perhaps the most striking facet of the Rules appears in
Rule 14(b). This rule states that the JPML will remand
actions not terminated in the transferee district court back
to the transferor court. 64 But the JPML will not remand
the action to its originating district if the transferee judge
has transferred the case pursuant to sections 1404(a) or
1406 of the United States Code to his own or another district. 65 The Rules contemplate that if the transferee judge
has transferred the case to another district other than the
transferor district, no further action of the JPML is
required.
Rule 14(b) appears to contradict the spirit, if not the
letter, of its enabling statute, the MLA. The MLA mandates that the transferee court will remand the action to
the transferor court after pretrial proceedings are terminated.66 Although the later subsections of Rule 14 outline
Oi

Id.

Marc Galanter, Reading The Landscape Of Disputes: What We Know And Don't
Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious Society, 31 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 5, 27-30 (1983). The author lists the reasons that set apart the minority who
do not settle from the majority who do settle. Id. Selected reasons include:
(1) the case is so complex or the outcome so indeterminate that it is too unwieldy
or costly to arrange a settlement; (2) even if the particulir bargain is acceptable,
the settlement might have detrimental effects on future transactions; (3) the settlement "value" is insufficient. Id.
' Wiegel, supra note 32, at 583. Slightly less than five percent of the actions
transferred by the JPML had been remanded to the district courts in which they
had been filed up to 1977. Id. Most are terminated in the transferee court by
settlement or transferred to the transferee district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1404(a), 1406. Id. See also Kastenmeier & Geyh, supra note 6, at 541 ("As a
practical matter, judges to whom cases have been transferred by the Panel for
pretrial proceedings have taken advantage of [the] venue statute so as to permit
them to retain jurisdiction of the consolidated litigation trial.").
64 Rule 14, supra note 60, at (b).
65 Id.
(;..28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1988).
11
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procedures under which parties may oppose or support
remand, the rule still creates a presumption against remand by the JPML without the suggestion of the transferee court.67 Realistically, then, a transferee court will
remand a case for trial to the transferor court only at the
discretion of a judge of the transferee court who has already invested substantial time and resources into the
case. The low remand percentage should not be
surprising.
The structural framework of the multidistrict litigation
system is sound. The federal courts may gather similar
types of civil cases into one forum for discovery purposes
quickly and efficiently.68 The MLA and the intricate and
exhaustive Rules of theJPML hasten and improve the discovery process in mass tort litigation. The MLA's final
product, although an efficient discovery process, leaves
many loose ends. A satisfactory discovery process without
a comparable satisfactory trial process still arrests effective disposition of these cases. The final objective should
be a comprehensive, efficient mechanism for global resolution of the legal and factual issues arising out of tortious
conduct affecting numerous victims. Simultaneously, this
ideal mass tort adjudication process would eliminate repetitious individual lawsuits in state and federal courts.
Since Congress ignores this problem, the courts forge
ahead on their own. Innovative federal judges stretch the
law and the procedures available to them, but tortured expansion of rules and statutes beyond their intended uses
spawns other difficulties, delays, and tensions for litigants. 69 The issues and nuances unique to mass tort liti,7See Rule 14, supra note 60, at (d). Rule 14(d) in pertinent part reads, "The
Panel is reluctant to order remand absent a suggestion of remand from the transferee district court .. ."Id.
' See Weigel, supra note 32, at 585.

Many federal judges have attempted to utilize the class action mechanism of
FRCP 23 in order to get around the limitations of the current federal procedural
system. The present system simply cannot cope with such large scale problems as
asbestos with the old tools. See In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 712 (5th Cir.
1990). See also Rein & Kirby, supra note 11, at 22 (detailing efforts by judges
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gation require new mechanisms and rules tailored for
them. Each segment of the law affiliated with mass torts
should undergo scrutiny to determine if change can
streamline the overall structure. The focus today dissects
the aviation law segment.
II.

SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OF MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION IN
AVIATION CASES

A.

Choice of Law

One of the ostensible purposes of multidistrict litigation is consolidation of cases with common issues of law
and fact before one judge. In the ideal multidistrict scenario the judge uses the vantage point over all of the cases
70
to give perspective and consistency to pretrial decisions.
If the judge oversees all of the individual cases, the process also leads to equality or at least consistency of compensation for all the victims in the multidistrict forum.
The present multidistrict litigation process does not even
approach that ideal.
In aviation crash cases, the transferee judge initially determines which jurisdiction's law will govern the issues in
the case. 71 The choice of law rulings take immediate precedence because of the outcome-determinative effect this
decision wields; once the law governing the issues is chosen, settlements can be evaluated realistically. 72 The law
Parker, Lambros and Weinstein in grappling with their tremendous caseloads with
innovative procedures.).
70 See Weigel, supra note 32, at 579, 583.
1, In re Aircrash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, 734 F. Supp. 1425, 1429 (N.D. Ill.
1990) [hereinafter Sioux City]. "The choice of law question... should be resolved
as early as possible. First and foremost, this determination may facilitate settlement negotiations and thus enable victims of the crash to be compensated expeditiously." Id.
72 See Airline Disaster Litig. Report, 127 F.R.D., 405, 407, 414, 416 (N.D. Ill.
1979) [hereinafter Report]. The multidistrict transferee court filed the Report
after the conclusion of the litigation involving the Chicago crash. The court noted
that choice of law issues were especially important to the resolution of the actions
and decided the issue early on. Id. at 414. After its decision, the court certified its
finding for interlocutory review by the Seventh Circuit, again noting the importance of the choice of law decision to settlements. Id. at 416.
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chosen by the transferee court to govern the issues in dispute at the pretrial stage invariably will be the law applied
to these issues at trial because of the doctrine of law of the
case. ,The only practical way that the transferee court's
choice of law decision could be disturbed is if an appellate
court overturned the decision. As an interlocutory decision, however, little chance exists for appellate review except through interlocutory appeal to the court of appeals
73
of the circuit of the transferee court.
Congress provides no national policy directive from
which a multidistrict court could infer the proper method
of choosing the law which should govern the issues in aviation conflicts of law decisions. The only guidance available to the transferee district court in this decision is
unhelpful and overinclusive. In Van Dusen v. Barrack,74 the
Supreme Court held that a transferee court must apply
the law that the transferor court would apply to cases
transferred to its docket. 75 The Erie doctrine mandates
7. Weigel, supra note 32, at 578 (Only the court of appeals for the transferee
district reviews the transferee court pretrial decisions. TheJPML does not). For
text of All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, see supra note 40.
74 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
The Supreme Court ruled that, for diversity cases, if a
defendant moved for transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), and the transfer was
accomplished, the transferee court was bound to apply the law that the transferor
court would have applied to the case. Id.
7. Id. In Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990), the Supreme Court
extended the Van Dusen rule that transferee courts must apply the law of the transferor forum in cases in which the plaintiff moved under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) for
transfer. Id.
Ferens involved a Pennsylvania farmer injured by farm equipment manufactured
by the defendant. The two-year Pennsylvania statute of limitations for tort actions
time-barred the plaintiff from receiving a tort remedy in Pennsylvania federal district court. Therefore, plaintiff filed suit in Mississippi whose six-year statute of
limitations had not yet run. Plaintiff then moved to transfer his case to the Pennsylvania federal court and sought application of the Mississippi statute of limitations in the case. The Pennsylvania federal court balked at this request and
dismissed the action. 639 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D. Pa. 1986). The court of appeals
affirmed. 819 F.2d 423 (3d Cir. 1987).
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and permitted plaintiff to go forward using the Mississippi statute of limitations in the Pennsylvania federal court.
The Court noted the forum shopping opportunities presented by its decision, but
stated that convenience governed transfer of venue under section 1404, rather
than prejudice to a party resulting from change of an applicable law. 494 U.S. at
528, 531-32.
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that the federal district courts, in diversity cases, must act
as a state court of the jurisdiction in which it sits. 76 Therefore, in multidistrict litigation, the transferee court makes
choice of law decisions on individual bases for each plaintiff or group of plaintiffs according to the choice of law
method
of the jurisdiction in which the suit was originally
7
filed.

7

The present choice of law methodology for multidistrict
litigation virtually assures forum shopping as well as wide
disparity in the compensation awards of airplane crash
victims. Assuming that the tortfeasor has sufficient contacts to be sued within a jurisdiction, courts do not require the victim to be a citizen of that jurisdiction to apply
that jurisdiction's choice of law method to his case.78
Therefore, hypothetically, two New York plaintiffs with
identical injuries seated next to one another on the same
plane who file suits in New York and in New Jersey could
receive drastically different compensation awards from
the same tortfeasor. The sole legal basis for the dichotomy lies within the different choice of law methods of
New York and New Jersey.
An outline of the specific choice of law methodology for
multidistrict courts faced with parties who file suit in several different states follows. The first step taken by the
transferee court is the determination of the choice of law
methods utilized by each state in which a suit has been
For a discussion of the Erie-Klaxon doctrine, see supra note 16.
F.2d at 605; D.C., 559 F. Supp. at 340; Detroit, 750 F. Supp. at
796, 797.
78 A plaintiff can generally file suit against a tortfeasor in any jurisdiction in
which the tortfeasor does business. The Supreme Court's recent discussion of
forum shopping in Ferens emphasized that opportunities for forum shopping
which exist within the present system are not necessarily to be condemned, but
should be minimized. See supra note 75. Therefore, a plaintiff can take advantage
of the opportunities within the system if they benefit his case. For instance, if a
plane crashes in State A and State A's choice of law method provides that the law
of the place of injury governs tort disputes, plaintiffs from other jurisdictions will
gain advantage from filing suit in State A. The transferee courts have no mandate
or authority to prevent this. The district court must apply the choice of law
method of the state in which it exercises jurisdiction. Detroit, 750 F. Supp. at 813.
7,;

77 Chicago, 644
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filed and subsequently transferred to its docket. 79 This initial inquiry may be difficult to satisfy. Choice of law
methods vary distinctly from state to state, and courts are
extremely unpredictable in their application to identical
fact situations even within their own states. 80 The states'
choice of law methods run the gamut from anachronistic
"lex loci delictus" rules to the "modern" Restatement of
Conflicts interest analysis.8 ' Many states complicate the
matter further since their state court of last resort has not
given its imprimatur to a particular choice of law
Chicago, 644 F.2d at 611, 621, 628. The Seventh Circuit's first step in each
choice of law determination was to identify each state's choice of law method. For
example, the court found that Illinois used the Restatement of Conflicts "most
significant relationship" test, California used the comparative impairment
method, and New York used a functional equivalent of the "most significant relationship" test. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS (1971).
- See Joseph A. Zirkman, Note, New Choice of Law Quagmire Revisited: O'Rourke v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 51 BROOK. L. REV. 579, 614-15 (1985) (describing the Second Circuit's attempt to decide the correct New York choice of law methodology
from inconsistent case law). New York courts have had an exceptionally difficult
time consistently applying a choice of law method to an issue. The progression of
cases involving automobile guest passengers and New York hosts serves as a good
example of the variance which can occur in application of choice of law methods.
For further discussion of the New York guest-host choice of law problems and
difficulty with consistent application of choice of law methods, see Herma Hill
Kay, Theory Into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L. REV. 521, 529-35
(1983).
81 Lex loci delictus established the common law basis for the initial Restatement
of Conflicts choice of law method. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLIcTs (1938). This
711

method codified the common law idea that the law of the place of injury governed
issues of law arising out of any occurrence. See D.C., 559 F. Supp. at 341. The
Second Restatement method generally notes that the law of the state with the
"most significant relationship" to the transaction/occurrence governs the legal
issues. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 6 (1971). Modern courts use
many variants of the choice of law methods to analyze the various interests and
policy choices of the interested jurisdiction in making choice of law determinations. These methods include: the comparative impairment method used in California, Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d 719, 720-21 (Cal.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 859 (1976); the Leflar better law method employed in Minnesota, Milkovich
v. Saari, 203 N.W.2d 408, 413 ( Minn. 1973); the government interest test utilized
by the District of Columbia, D.C., 559 F. Supp. 333, 341-42; and the center of
gravity method pioneered by New York, see supra note 80. See also Kay, supra note
80, at 591-92 (chart disclosing the choice of law methods for every American jurisdiction). Kay's article focuses on a determination of whether American jurisdictions are correctly applying their chosen choice of law methods. Id. at 524. She
concluded that they were not. Id. at 586.
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method. 2
At this stage, the court's choice of law inquiry may end.
If a state in which a plaintiff filed suit continues to utilize
the place of injury test as indicative of the law which
should govern the dispute, the court applies the law of the
place where the tort occurred to all issues in that case. 3
If the state in which a suit filed uses a modern choice of
law method, the next task of the transferee court is to undertake a choice of law analysis for each specific issue in
the suit. This choice of law process is known as
depecage.84
Initially, using modern choice of law methods, the court
analyzes the law of all states with important contacts or
interests in having its law apply to an issue. The court
next determines whether the laws of the interested states
conflict. 85 If they do not conflict, the law of either state
can be applied to the issue. If the laws do conflict, the
court determines which state possesses the greatest interest in having its law applied through a choice of law analysis. 6 Using depecage, the court designates the law of a
specific state to govern each of the separate issues of the
case: liability, compensatory and punitive damages,
joint
87
and several liability, and prejudgment interest.
82 D.C., 559 F. Supp. at 359, 361. The court held that the federal district court
must apply the law as it believes that the state supreme court of the jurisdiction
would apply the law. Because Georgia and Maryland respectively still apply lex
loci delictus, a federal district court might hold that the state supreme court would
apply a modern choice of law method to these cases. Id. In Chicago, the court
discussed the quandary which occurred because the choice of law method of Hawaii had not been clearly defined by that state's supreme court. 644 F.2d at 630.
In the situation where the choice of law method could not be discerned, the Seventh Circuit held that the forum should apply the choice of law method of the
state in which the multidistrict court is located. Id. at 631.
",D.C., 559 F. Supp. at 361. The D.C. court found that Georgia had not abandoned lex loci delictus. As the site of the crash, D.C. law would govern every
issue, except the apportionment issue, because the D.C. and Georgia laws conflicted. Georgia courts will not apply the law of a state with which its own state
laws conflict. Id.
,4Chicago, 644 F.2d at 610-11; Sioux City, 734 F. Supp. at 1429.
Detroit, 750 F. Supp. at 796.
I
Id.
In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l Airport, Denver, Colo, 720 F. Supp.
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The list of interested states varies for different issues
depending on the group of plaintiffs involved. An example places this process in context. If four groups of plaintiffs filed suits in Michigan, Arizona, Florida and
California, such as in In re Disaster at Detroit Metropolitan
Airport (Detroit),"8 the court will analyze each issue with regard to each group of plaintiffs. In Detroit, for example,
the issues of products liability and punitive damages underwent choice of law analysis.8 9 The defendants in that
case were McDonnell Douglas (MDC) and Northwest
Airlines .90
For the products liability claims of the Arizona plaintiffs
against MDC, the Detroit court examined the products liability laws of Michigan (the place of injury), California
(where the allegedly defective parts were produced), Missouri (MDC's principal place of business), and Arizona
(the plaintiffs' domicile). 9 ' Arizona's choice of law methodology requires use of the Restatement (Second) of
Conflicts' "most significant relationship" test. 92 This test
posits that the law of the place of injury should govern
tort issues unless another state has a more significant relationship to the issues.93 The Restatement (Second) lists
factors for courts to consider in making this decision, but
1505 (D. Colo. 1989) [hereinafter Denver III]. The Denver case illustrates this phe-

nomenon. The Denver case arose out of the crash of a Continental Airlines DC-9
at Denver's Stapleton Airport. Denver 1, 720 F. Supp. at 1447. The plane crashed
as it attempted a takeoff in a snowstorm, killing 28 people and injuring 54 people.
Id. The court held an exemplar trial. The exemplar trial plaintiff filed suit in
Idaho. Denver H, 720 F. Supp. at 1455, 1457. The court applied Texas law to her
punitive damages and Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act claims. Denver III, 720
F. Supp. at 1505, 1528. Colorado law applied to the negligence and prejudgment
interest issues. Id. Idaho law applied to the exemplar plaintiff's compensatory
damages award, and the law of the state in which their suits were filed would apply
to the other consolidated plaintiffs' compensatory damages claims. Id.
8 750 F. Supp. at 796. This case arose out of the crash of a Northwest Airlines
DC-9 which occured shortly after takeoff and killed 156 persons. One hundred
fifty-seven cases had been filed as of the date of the opinion. Id.
'"Id.
9"Id.

Id. at 802-04.
92

Id. at 803.

'. See supra note 81. See also Detroit, 750 F. Supp. at 798, 803 for a discussion of
the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law's choice of law method.
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it does not furnish a hierarchy or scale indicating the appropriate weight each factor should receive.94
The Detroit court struggled to determine which state's
relationship to the products liability issue was the most
significant. The inquiry boiled down to the judge's decision about which state had the most significant relationship to an allegedly defective product manufactured in
California by a Missouri corporation which injured an Arizona plaintiff in Michigan. The intricacy of this explanation demonstrates the subjectiveness that engulfs
multidistrict courts when they make conflicts of law decisions for mass torts.
The Detroit court selected California law to govern the
products liability claims of the Arizona plaintiffs against
MDC.95 The court then conducted the choice of law process eight more times on the issue of the availability of
punitive damages: four times for punitive damage claims
against MDC and Northwest respectively.96 At the end of
its opinion, the Detroit court required that the parties brief
the choice of law issue with regard to compensatory damage claims, foreshadowing another four trips through the
choice of law process.97
As the Detroit case illustrates, the multidistrict transferee
court applies the law of no existing jurisdiction to the
cases; a collage of law governs because of depecage. 98
The judge's tremendous discretionary powers in making
choice of law decisions flow from the open ended modern
choice of law decisionmaking process. Depecage increases the trial judge's power because it allows the judge
to craft his choice of law decisions in any rational way that
he sees fit to do so.99 Of course, certain due process conId. at 802.
, Id. at 804.
Ild. at 804-12.
IId. at 813.

1,4

'

See supra note 84, at 796.

See Reese, supra note 9, at 1304-05.
The [modern cases dealing with airplane accidents] make for dreary
reading, but, worse still, they do not state the real reasons which led
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stitutional boundaries limit the judge, but the choice of
law process still leaves room for manipulation and pretextual justifications. The Supreme Court understated its
characterization
of modern choice of law methods as
"malleable." 10 0 Depecage exacerbates disuniformity and
unpredictability in conflicts of law decisions.
Nevertheless, in important choice of law decisions regarding the issues of liability and compensatory and punitive damages in mass aviation disaster cases, disturbing
trends have formed. In multidistrict litigation cases involving aviation negligence and products liability claims,
the place of injury has provided the law governing disposition of issues through court rulings or party stipulation. 0 1 This result occurred even though most states
have abandoned the lex loci delictus approach for modern
choice of law methods. Most plaintiffs receive compensa0 2
tory damages according to the law of their home states.1
Finally, once a judge decides that a particular jurisdicthe court to the particular decision. It seems almost certain that by
and large the judges first decided upon the result they wished to
reach and only then thought of a rationale that would more or less
support their conclusions....

The results reached in the cases may

well be desirable, but the written opinions hardly aid in the development of the law since the reasons they advance are so largely a sham.
Id.
.... Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 252 n.18 (1981).
, D.C., 559 F. Supp. at 351. In the D.C. crash, an Air Florida jet B-737 departed from Washington National Airport, the airport closest to downtown.
Shortly after takeoff, the airplane hit a bridge that crosses the Potomac and separates D.C. from Virginia. Seventy persons died. The victims were from seven
states. Id. at 339. The court ruled that D.C. law applied to major issues in the
case. Id. at 351, 359. See also Denver H, 720 F. Supp. at 1472. In the Denver case,
the parties agreed by stipulation that Colorado law, the law of the site of the crash,
governed the issue of negligence liability. Id. The Denver court further held that
Colorado law applied to the issue of prejudgment interest. Denver III, 720 F.
Supp. at 1530. Generally, the Denver court found that Colorado law applied to all
issues in the multidistrict cases before it unless the parties proved otherwise. Id.
at 1529. See also Chicago, 644 F.2d at 621, 626 (Illinois law, law of place of injury,
applied to issue of punitive damages in almost every case).
102 Denver I1, 720 F. Supp. at 1472 (compensation awards resolved by plaintiff's
home states); In re Air Crash at Boston, Mass., 399 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Mass 1975).
In Boston the plaintiffs received damage awards according to the laws of their
home states: Vermont, New York, New Hampshire, Massachusetts and Florida.
Id. at 1112, 1114, 1116. See Chicago, 127 F.R.D. at 401.
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tion's law governs an issue, for instance, products liability
claims against a certain defendant, the judge applies that
law generally to govern all products liability claims against
that defendant. The federal courts should develop a
more principled and efficient choice of law mechanism.
B.

Punitive Damages

Punitive damages penalize the tortfeasor for his tortious conduct and seek to deter him from engaging in that
conduct in the future. 0 3 The availability of punitive damages is a hotly contested issue in every air disaster multidistrict proceeding. 04 The availability of punitive
damages affects both the amount of settlement offers and
the willingness of parties to go to trial. Transferee courts
dispense with choice of law decisions early in the adjudication process precisely because of the punitive damage
0 5
issue in many air accident cases.
The current system leaves open the possibility of punitive damages in every aviation crash case since the choice
of law decision in aviation accidents can turn out many
different ways. No incentive exists for parties to settle
their cases immediately after an accident. Plaintiffs and
their attorneys hope for large punitive damage awards.
They are reluctant to sign releases for all of their potential
claims if the chance for an astronomically larger award exists. 106 Airlines will litigate the punitive damages issue to
trial rather than provide huge settlements to plaintiffs
-.1 City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1981); W.
Page Keeton, et al., PRossoR AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9 (5th ed.

1984). "Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory or nominal
damages, awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct and
to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the future." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979).
- Chicago, 644 F.2d at 604; D.C., 559 F. Supp. at 352; Denver 1, 720 F. Supp. at
1449; Sioux City, 734 F. Supp. at 1429-30; Detroit, 750 F. Supp. at 795. In each of
these airline accident multidistrict litigation cases, the courts above delivered
lengthy early opinions regarding the issue of punitive damages availability.
1..5See Sioux City, 734 F. Supp. at 1429; Report, 127 F.R.D. at 414.
1- Craft, supra note 4, at 912. "[N]othing de-stabilizes settlement discussions
more than the hope of recovering punitive damages." Id.
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whose expectation of punitive damages toughens their
settlement negotiating positions. In contrast, airlines will
readily admit liability in return for plaintiff's release of
punitive claims.' 0 7 Because of these realities, the punitive
damages issue inflates transaction costs and lengthens the
litigation process.
The previous discussion of choice of law in multidistrict
proceedings demonstrated the way in which the availability of punitive damages is decided by the transferee
courts.' 0 The previous discussion also highlighted that,
in many cases, multidistrict transferee courts now serve as
the trial court for their transferred cases.' 0 9 If the transferee court rules that the law of a state that allows punitive
damages governs the issue of punitive damages, the plaintiff earns the right to go to the jury on that question. If
several groups of plaintiffs with punitive claims governed
by the law of different jurisdictions present their case to
the jury, special problems for the multidistrict transferee
court arise.
Attempting to apply different standards of punitive liability in a case in which a jury must evaluate the defendant's conduct presents enormous problems of
complexity." 0 The process of explaining incompatible
standards of punitive liability will require immense
amounts of attorney time, court patience, and jury com-

,17Chicago, 644 F.2d at 635. In Chicago, the parties stipulated that in turn for
the plaintiff's waiver of punitive damages, the defendant would waive the right to
contest liability for compensatory damages. Id. The case went to trial on the issue
of prejudgment interest. Id. The defendants in the Chicago case offered this arrangement to all victims. Report, supra note 68 at 407-08. The parties in the
Tenerife crash agreed that plaintiffs would not claim punitive damages and defendants would not contest compensatory damage liability. Craft, supra note 4, at
905.
-s See supra notes 70-102 and accompanying text.
110.See supra note 63.

1Io Jim Fieweder, Note, The Need For Reform Of Punitive Damages In Mass Tort Litigation:Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 39 DEPALJL L. REV. 775, 796 (1990). "Characteristics of decentralization innately associated with current litigation procedures,
such as multiplicity ofjuries hearing the cases and the variety of standards used in
jurisdictions, produce difficulties in awarding punitive damages in mass tort
cases." Id.
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prehension. The procedural obstacles will certainly
lengthen the trial, and they may also distract the jury from
more crucial issues. Jury confusion will inevitably result.
The jury in In re Air Crash Disasterat Stapleton International
Airport, Denver, Colorado, (Denver)' I confronted this situation. Their answers illustrate the problems inherent in
asking a group of laymen to come to a coherent conclusion in an area of the law that taxes the understanding of
even experienced attorneys. The jury found that the defendant's conduct had been willful or reckless with regard
to the Idaho plaintiffs. ' 2 This finding entitled the victims
to a recovery beyond Idaho's $400,000 limit for noneconomic damages.' ' 3 The jury also found that the defendant had not acted grossly negligent and should not be
14
held liable for punitive damages under Texas law.'
From the perspective that the jury allowed substantial recovery to Idaho plaintiffs, while refusing to penalize the
defendant for punitive damages, the jury may have known
exactly what it was doing. That conclusion, however,
does not rationally explain the difference between grossly
negligent and willful or reckless conduct in an intellectually sound fashion. Judge Finesilver's effort to reconcile
the Denver jury's verdict with the law demonstrates how
this complex process strains judicial integrity." '5
The punitive damages issue also tries the patience of
many transferee courts. A large number of courts appear
to avoid the complication of the issue entirely by choosing
the law of a state that forbids punitive damages to govern
the issue.1, 6 This action quickly ends a court's immediate
problem, but it only postpones tough decisions. It may

111

In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l Airport, Denver, Colo., 720 F.
Supp. 1467 (D. Colo. 1989) [hereinafter Denver IV]. See supra note 83 and accompanying text for a discussion of multidistrict litigation. The descriptions of trial
preparations appear within the Denver I case. 720 F. Supp. at 1460-61.
11 Denver IV, 720 F. Supp. at 1474.
",

Id.

'I

Id.

,15 Id. at 1474-78.
11..Craft, supra note 4, at 910-11.
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ultimately result in bad case law for future deserving
plaintiffs. A quick decision may not be the correct one. In
Chicago, the court chose Illinois law, the law of the place of
injury, to govern the punitive damages issue against defendants McDonnell Douglas Corporation (MDC) and
American Airlines." 7 Illinois law does not permit punitive damages." 8 In Detroit, the law of Michigan, the place
of injury, forbids punitive damages. 19 Michigan law gov0
erned such claims against MDC and Northwest Airlines.12
In Sioux City, Illinois law governed punitive claims against
United Airlines.' 1 Ohio law governed punitive damage
claims against General Electric, and California law governed claims against MDC. 22 The laws of Ohio and Cali23
fornia, coincidentally, prevent punitive damages claims.
In the cases discussed above, the law governing punitive damages chosen by modern choice of law methods
was either the place of injury or the home state of the corporation involved. Although lex loci delictus has been
abandoned for many years, it appeared to be a factor in
the decisions. The designation of the home state law of a
corporation to govern its punitive damage liability increases the potential for manipulation by the corporation.' 24 In making these choice of law decisions, courts
note that the home state of a corporation has an interest
in that corporation's conduct. 125 Neither the place of injury nor the home state of a corporation should be guiding forces when determining the availability of punitive
damages for multidistrict courts. In the attempt to fill the
void, most courts retreat to familiar, yet anachronistic
concepts.
Chicago, 644 F.2d at 604.
"1 Detroit, 750 F. Supp. at 805-06.
1

Id.

2 Id. at 813.

Sioux City, 734 F. Supp. at 1434.
Id.
-2, Id. at 1431, 1433.
24 Detroit, 750 F. Supp. at 805. As the Detroit court noted, states have an interest in protecting their home state corporations. Id.
121
122

1'2.

Id.
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The wide spectrum available for punitive damages from
state to state, coupled with the unpredictability of courts'
choice of law decisions, promotes both forum shopping
and a lack of uniformity of damage awards for similarly
suited victims.' 26 Punitive damage awards further promote wide disparity in compensation awards for victims
depending on where their case has been filed. Even if the
state law governing a case allows punitives, disparity between victim awards can occur when one plaintiff can
prove to ajury that the tortfeasor's actions justify punitive
damages and other plaintiffs cannot so sway a jury within
the same jurisdiction. 2 7 Such divergent results should
not occur when the same tortfeasor conduct is at issue.
The changing liability standards caused by the availability of punitive damages from state to state and the tangled
choice of law rules unfavorably affect airlines. In aviation
multidistrict cases, because of varying standards among
the states where plaintiffs file suit, an airline could be subject to multiple punitive damage awards for the same conduct. A jury could award punitive damages to plaintiffs
from various states which allow punitive claims. In Detroit,
for example, the Florida, California, Arizona and Michiawards
gan plaintiffs could each receive separate 2punitive
8
damages.
punitive
allowed
states
if those
Unfortunately, the previous description is only the tip
Id. at 814.
See Detroit, 750 F. Supp. at 795. The laws of Michigan and California govern
the punitive damages issue with respect to MDC. Id. If, for instance, California
law allowed punitive damages (though it does not), the victims of this crash could
receive compensation at drastically different levels since California plaintiffs could
potentially share in a punitive damage award unavailable to the other plaintiffs as
a matter of law.
,28 Detroit, 750 F. Supp. at 796. The plaintiffs in the Detroit case were from the
named states. Id. See also 1 Linda L. Schleuter & Kenneth R. Redden, PUNITIVE
DAMAGES § 4.4(A)(5)(b)(2) (2d ed. 1989) (discussing the disparity among verdicts
in the MER/29 cases); Rand Corporation, ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS 42 (1985).
The Rand Corporation noted that "[slick people and people who died a terrible
death from asbestos are being turned away from the courts, while people with
minimal injuries who may never suffer severe asbestos disease are being awarded
hundreds of thousands of dollars, and even in excess of a million dollars." Rand
Corporation at 42.
1"

127
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of the iceberg. In the hypothetical, one jury could make
the multiple punitive awards according to the law of different states, making up one total punitive award against
the airline. In reality, numerous jury awards of punitive
damages can occur around the country. Since the JPML
does not have the power to pull related state cases into
the federal courts, airlines can be repeatedly penalized for
the same conduct. Many tortfeasors argue that multiple,
successive punitive damage liability is violative of their
due process rights.' 2 9 Though the Supreme Court denies
the problem, the intuitive injustice of multiple
successive
30
apparent.1
remains
liability
damage
punitive
Despite these disadvantages, evidence that punitive
damage awards have any deterrent effect on airlines does
not exist. Uniform federal regulations cover every aspect
of the airline industry.' 3 ' Airlines retain little independent control over safety standards. Federal agencies monitor airline conduct closely and impose fines and penalties
for deviation from their detailed guidelines. 3 2 Since victims receive huge full compensation awards, airlines suffer significant economic hardship from compensatory
damage awards arising from airline accidents and the accompanying negative publicity. 33 Finally, insurance costs
121 Sioux City, 734 F. Supp. at 1427. The defendants argued that the due process
clause of the 14th Amendment prevented punitive damages in their case. Id. The
Sioux City court noted in ruling against defendants that twice in recent years the
Supreme Court declined to validate such arguments, See Browing-Ferris Indust. v.
Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989); Banker's Life & Casualty v. Crenshaw,
486 U.S. 71 (1988).
See also Chicago, 644 F.2d at 608. Defendants argued that punitives violate the
equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment, because New York allows punitives in personal injury but not in wrongful death actions. Id. at 609. The Seventh
Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling that punitives did not violate the Constitution because the New York limitations were not irrational and were legislative
determinations. Id. at 610.
1- Sioux City, 734 F. Supp. at 1427 (Supreme Court denied certiorari in other
cases raising due process objections to punitive damages).
-, See 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1304-1551 (1988) (enabling the FAA to regulate the
aviation industry). Unfortunately, the Supreme Court ruled conclusively that the
FAA does not preempt punitive damages. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464
U.S. 238, 248-58 (1984).
"- See generally 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1304-1551 (1988).
See Terry Maxon, Final Approach - Plaskettit Says 'Landing Pan Am deal was in-
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climb steeply after an airline accident. 34 In an era in
which airline bankruptcies are commonplace and federal
the industry, punitive awards
safety standards dominate
5
do not make sense.13
Certainly defendants should answer for their actions to
all persons affected by their conduct. If the jurisdiction
mandates punitive damage awards, the defendant should
be penalized to the extent that his conduct reaches the
requisite level of blameworthiness. Today's punitive
damage awards, though, occur haphazardly without any
national consensus. The judicial system should not punish defendants repeatedly, oblivious to previous punitive
awards. Moreover, the defendant should not suffer repetitious punishment because the system does not provide a
procedure wherein a defendant may answer for its conduct before a central forum to all plaintiffs on this issue.
Overall, the current system for awarding punitive damages needlessly complicates the multidistrict litigation
process for aviation disasters. Punitive damages inflate
transaction costs, strain judicial resources, discourage setcredibly exciting, frustrating,' DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 15, 1991, at D4. An interview with Thomas F. Plaskett revealed:
An even bigger factor afflicting Pam Am: the December 1988 terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, Mr.
Plaskett said. The incident killed all 259 people aboard the Boeing
747, and falling wreckage claimed 11 others on the ground.
Suddenly nobody wanted to fly Pan Am. In the months after the
Lockerbie bombing, Pan Am's first class and business class traffic
declined 40 to 50 percent, and some of it never returned to Pan Am,
he said.
'Lockerbie was devastating. There is no other word to describe it,
both in human terms and in economic terms. Lockerbie cost us, on
a cash basis, probably in the range of $400 million to $450 million
cash,' he said.
Id.
,3 Airlines must carry huge insurance coverage for all flights. See Laurence
Barron, Aircraft Accident Investigation - Whose Interest Prevails?, IX AIR L. 87, 90
(1984). "It is no longer unusual to find airlines carrying per accident cover up to
500 [m]illion [diollars, and in one transaction I have seen a contractual requirement for the airline concerned to carry cover up to 1 [billion [d]ollars." Id. at 90.
See also Asra Q Nomani & Susan Pulliam, USAir Group Cuts Insurance On Its Aircraft,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 1991, at A3. Immediately after the recent LAX accident
USAir was forced to cut its insurance coverage because of rising rates. Id.
-r, See supra note 7.
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tlement, and confuse juries. Punitive damages should be
abolished or Congress should install a system to centralize punitive awards in one court for each tortfeasor to be
penalized with one verdict. In that way, the tortfeasor
could be penalized and the victims could share equally in
the punitive damage award.
C.

Case Consolidationand Transfer Effects

The most significant outgrowth of the MLA over the
past two decades has been the trial of consolidated cases
from many districts in one forum. The MLA presented
for the first time a device to consolidate related cases filed
in different federal district courts into one district for pretrial proceedings. Once the system gathered the cases
into one forum for discovery, the natural progression was
to a trial of common issues by the forum which supervised
discovery of the consolidated cases. Unfortunately, the
MLA nowhere expressly authorizes the concept.
The MLA refers exclusively to pretrial proceedings.
Yet federal courts improvise with the tools provided in 28
U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) and 1406 to transfer the cases consolidated for pretrial proceedings from the district which handled the multidistrict pretrial proceedings to the same
district for trial of common issues. Rule 14 of the Rules of
136
the JPML explicitly recognizes this method of action.
Because the MLA never envisioned such a trial, no statutory provision details the effects such a trial will have on
related cases.
The preclusive effect of a judgment or jury verdict is
relatively predictable and easy to understand when two
parties or individuals litigate an issue. 37 But in a consolidated trial of multidistrict litigation, the effects on future
claimants or even on all consolidated parties is not so easily defined. The legal doctrine of res judicata bars reliti1'.1;See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
137 Petromanagement Corp. v. Acme-Thomas Joint Venture, 835 F.2d 1329,
1332-33 (10th Cir. 1988). Federal law controls the preclusive effects of successive
diversity suits insofar as the res judicata issue is not clearly substantive. Id.
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gation of adjudicated claims between the same parties." 8
Collateral estoppel operates as an equitable doctrine to
preclude relitigation of an issue in certain circumstances if
one of the parties to a later action participated as a party
in the first action.' 39 Formerly, use of collateral estoppel
assumed that if the doctrine barred relitigation of an issue, both parties should be able to assert the doctrine;
this concept is called mutuality.140 The Supreme Court
abandoned mutuality of estoppel for litigation between
two parties in certain situations.' 4 ' The application of collateral estoppel or res judicata to the multidistrict arena
remains a largely unsettled area of the law.
A consolidated trial in multidistrict proceedings occurred in the Denver case. 42 The JPML transferred the
plaintiffs' suits filed in various districts against the defendant, Continental Airlines, to a Colorado federal court for
pretrial proceedings.' 43 The judge then formally transferred the consolidated cases already on his docket to his
court for trial pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 144 The
judge made these motions with the concurrence of all
parties.'45
Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979).

'.'

United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158 (1984). See Lawlor v. National
Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955) for a discussion of the distinction
between collateral estoppel and res judicata. John Kennelly, Note, May Estoppel
By Verdict Be Applied in A So-Called Exemplar Trial? In Re Air Crash at Stapleton International, 33 TRIAL LAw. GUIDE 580, 589 (1989).
140 See Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329
(1971).
,4, Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329 (1979). The procedural
posture in Parklane arose from a securities fraud charge filed by the Securities
Exchange Commission against the defendant. Id. In the initial case the court
found in favor of the SEC. The parties in the case at bar then wished to use
offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel in order to prevent the defendant from
relitigating certain issues which had already been litigated in the first suit and
found adverse to defendant. Id. The Supreme Court ruled that despite the lack of
mutuality, the defendant could not relitigate the issues again. Id.
,'-" Denver II1, 720 F. Supp. at 1511. See also In re Air Crash at Detroit Metropolitan Airport, Detroit, Michigan on Aug. 16, 1987, 776 F. Supp. 316, 318-19 (another consolidated trial similar to that conducted in the Denver case).
,4-1Denver II, 720 F. Supp. at 1510.
144 Id.
14. Id.
'

"
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Counsel also agreed that the court would conduct an
exemplar trial to resolve specific issues common to all
cases pending at that time: liability and punitive and compensatory damages. 46 Two plaintiffs' cases, one of defendant's and one of the plaintiff's choice, would be tried
before the court. 147 These cases would serve as the exemplar trial for these issues in all cases consolidated in the
District of Colorado.148 An exemplar trial tremendously
expedites the adjudication process since only one jury will
decide verdicts for all the consolidated cases. This process prevents repetitious presentation of the identical factual circumstances of the crash for each victim's suit.
To facilitate this arrangement, the court first consolidated the cases for trial pursuant to FRCP 42(a) and then
bifurcated the trial pursuant to FRCP 42(b). 49 All parties
and the court approved the trial plan. 50 This plan mandated that after liability was determined, each case would
be returned to the district in which it was filed for individualized compensatory damage awards.' 5' The plan also
specified that if the exemplar trial jury found that defendant's conduct warranted punitive damages, this award
would be distributed among all the plaintiffs on a pro rata
basis. 5 2 The parties stipulated that Colorado law gov1 53
erned the issue of Continental's negligence liability.
The court had previously ruled that Texas law governed
54
any potential punitive damage liability of Continental.
The case proceeded to trial on the claims of the two cho55
sen plaintiffs and lasted twenty-two days.'
Since the trial represented adjudication of the claims of
numerous parties, the court afforded plaintiffs wide lati146 Id.

"IDenver 11,

720 F. Supp. at 1457.
Denver I1, 720 F. Supp. at 1511.
'41, Denver 11, 720 F. Supp. at 1459.
'48

Id. at 1460.
Id. at 1458.
1-12 Denver IV, 720 F. Supp. at 1472.
1.1 Id.
''

Denver I, 720 F. Supp. at 1447.

'-.Denver 111, 720 F. Supp. at 1511.
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tude in presenting evidence to the jury. 56 The exemplar
trial jury heard evidence in three categories: a) conduct
of Continental personnel during the long period between
de-icing and takeoff, b) the effect of impact on the plane's
interior and the subsequent panic, and c) emergency efforts following the crash. 5 7 Ordinarily, only the first category would be relevant to these two plaintiffs' cases. The
only evidence excluded by the trial court was the testimony of individual witnesses' lasting emotional or physical trauma. "58
' The excluded testimony graphically and
clearly detailed the impact of the crash on a planeload of
passengers.
The jury found Continental's conduct negligent according to Colorado law but undeserving of punitive damage
punishment under Texas law.159 The jury awarded full
60
compensatory damages to the exemplary plaintiffs.
The effect of this jury finding on all of the related consolidated cases in the District of Colorado became the subject
of extensive litigation. Ten tag-along plaintiffs were
caught up in this controversy. They filed their cases
against Continental during the course of the exemplar
trial.16 ' The court's decision to bind or exclude these
plaintiffs from the verdict of the exemplar trial would exert important practical consequences in gauging the value
of the exemplar trial to both plaintiffs and defendants.
In its examination of the issue the court found that nonmutual collateral estoppel could not be used as a defense
by Continental against plaintiffs who were not joined in
the exemplar trial. 62 To bind these plaintiffs, the court
searched for privity or some control relationship connecting these ten tag-along plaintiffs to the exemplar trial
v- Denver IV, 720 F. Supp. at 1480.
1.5 Id.
',. Id.
' Id. at 1474.
, ' Denver III, 720 F. Supp. at 1511.
Id. at 1521.
1112 Id.
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plaintiffs. 63 Unless such a relationship existed, Continental's assertion of collateral estoppel against these later
plaintiffs would violate the due process rights of the tagalong plaintiffs. 64 The court ruled that eight of the ten
plaintiffs whose cases were filed during the trial lacked the
mutuality necessary for the defendant to estop relitigation
65
of the claims tried in the exemplar trial.
The court also found that two of the tag-along cases did
manifest characteristics which gave their cases mutuality
of estoppel.166 These two plaintiffs filed their cases three
days before the exemplar trial. 167 Their counsel served as
a member of the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee and as
lead trial counsel during the exemplar trial. 168 The pleadings of each case exhibited language showing that these
1 69
plaintiffs intended to participate in the exemplar trial.
Thus, the court bound these two plaintiffs to the exemplar
70
jury's verdict.
Though the trial expedited the court's disposition of
these crash cases, this exemplar trial did not bind all of
the suits in this multidistrict litigation. Many other related suits occupied the attention of the court. The court
could potentially have to preside over future trials arising
out of the Denver crash.' 7 ' The workings of JPML,
though relatively quick, delayed transfer sufficiently so
that cases filed in districts other than that of the transferee
court were not consolidated with the other cases in time
to bind them to the exemplar jury verdict. 72 The JPML
should not be faulted here, however, because it does not
possess the power to compel plaintiffs to file suit.
Federal courts wielding the power of the MLA do not
63Id.

',

Id.

1P Id.

Id. at 1523.
'
I

Id. at 1522.

Id.

Ii;' /d.

Id. at 1523.
I7"
17,
172

Id. at 1534-35.
Id.

690

JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE

[57

have the capacity to adequately address the problem of
multiple actions arising from an identical fact pattern
causing injury to a large number of plaintiffs whose injuries are not discovered until many years later. Neither the
JPML nor the MLA provide any authority to set a deadline
or limitation period beyond which plaintiffs may not seek
compensation in the federal system for mass torts.
Though the MLA facilitates a global resolution of airline
crash litigation, nothing currently prevents another plaintiff from filing a later related suit in a federal forum. Fifty
state laws provide limitation periods applicable to the federal system for aviation cases based on diversity
73
jurisdiction. 1
Because many plaintiffs may file suit in state court, federal courts cannot attain jurisdiction over related state actions for a comprehensive adjudication of all litigation
relating to an airline accident. The court in Denver experienced this problem. In its final memorandum addressing
the collateral estopppel issue, the court discussed two
plaintiff crew members' motion for a voluntary nonsuit. 174 The injuries suffered by these plaintiffs arose out
75
of the identical conduct that injured the other plaintiffs. 1
The exemplar jury rendered a verdict on their employer's
liability for that conduct.' 76 Yet because the plaintiffs
wished to sue in state court, the multidistrict court had to
77
grant their motion.
These plaintiffs, like hundreds of similarly situated persons, would choose to litigate their claims in state
court. 78 The Denver plaintiffs' claims alluded to here did
Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
Denver 111, 720 F. Supp. at 1525. These crew member plaintiffs sought a
voluntary non-suit according to FRCP 41(a)(2). Id. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2).
The voluntary dismissal is a dismissal by the court without prejudice unless the
court specifies differently. Id. A court must deem the dismissal proper using its
discretion. Id.
17, Denver I1, 720 F. Supp. at 1524.
17.

174

17,

Id.

Id. at 1525.
See Report, 127 F.R.D. at 406. In the Chicago case, plaintiffs filed seventy
cases in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County; these cases could not be dis177

178
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contain substantial state statutory legal questions which
necessitated state court review.' 79 Nevertheless, these
cases still duplicated the liability findings of the multidistrict court.180 State courts which repeat actions of the federal courts are wasteful and inefficient; unfortunately,
8
such a result is unavoidable under the present system.' '
The subsequent effect of multidistrict trials on related
cases remains uncharted. No policy or statutory directive
guides the courts regarding these proceedings. Though
the multidistrict trials greatly expedite the federal system's disposition of mass tort litigation, much inefficiency
lingers. With concerted effort and principled consideration, great strides could be made to improve the case consolidation and transfer ability of the federal courts. If the
Congress or the courts choose to act, the system could
evolve into an extremely useful tool to handle the mass
aviation tort litigation problem and perhaps other substantive areas of law.
III.

PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS

The American legal system desperately needs new procedures and substantive law to effectively handle mass tort
litigation. Several alternatives for legislative and judicial
action contain viable options for management of a growing mass tort caseload. Many of these options alter current mechanisms to provide greater usefulness and
application. Recent proposals for reform shed light on areas that critics target for restructuring. These changes,
along with considerations unique to mass torts in the airline litigation context, will form the basis of a proposal to
maximize the efficiency and responsiveness of the legal
system to mass airline accidents.
posed of by the multidistrict court which theJPML set up to deal with these cases.
Id. The federal court system could not obtain jurisdiction over these cases for lack
of diversity, and the defendants could not remove the cases to federal court for
the same reason. Id.
Denver 111, 720 F. Supp. at 1525.
179

so Id.

See Report, 127 F.R.D., at 407.
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A. Multiparty, Multiforum JurisdictionAct of 1989
The United States House of Representatives recently
passed the Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of
1989 (Bill).' 82 This Bill paralleled the Court Reform and
Access to Justice Act 8 3 which contained a similar scheme
to revamp federal court procedure and likewise passed
the House but failed to achieve Senate approval. The Bill
proposes interesting modes of dealing with the mass tort
problems discussed previously in the context of airplane
crash disasters. It serves as a useful starting point in fashioning a constructive solution.
The first substantive section of the Bill, section 2, begins by expanding federal court subject matter jurisdiction. It allows parties with minimal diversity to gain
access to federal courts if their injuries arise from a single
event in which twenty-five or more persons are injured simultaneously, and the plaintiff claims $50,000 in damages. 84 The statute envisions three scenarios involving
minimal diversity: 1) a defendant resides in one state and
a substantial part of the event sued upon occurred in another state, 2) any two defendants reside in different
states, and 3) substantial parts of the event sued upon
took place in different states. 85 This section of the bill
also permits a party to intervene as a matter of right in any
action arising out of the major tortious event. 8 6 This section confers the right of intervention even if that party
could not ordinarily file suit in an action in federal district
87
court.
Section 3 amends the venue provision of 28 U.S.C.
112 H.R. 3406, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., (1989) reprinted in 135 CoNG. REC. E3275
(daily ed. Oct. 4, 1989) [hereinafter H.R. 3406]. For a detailed discussion of the
origination and background of H.R. 3406 and its substantive text, see Kastenmeier & Geyh, supra note 6, at 551. Representative Robert Kastemeier of Wisconsin introduced the bill into the United States House of Representatives.
IN, Court Reform and Access to Justice Act of 1989, H.R. 4807, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in 134 CONG. REC. H7443 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1988).
184 H.R. 3406, supra note 182, § 2(a).
185

Id.

8K

Id.

IN7

Id.
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§ 1391 by designating venue to be proper in any district
in which defendant resides or in which a substantial part
of the event sued upon occurred. 88 Section 4 amends 28
U.S.C. § 1407 by authorizing courts that have presided
over consolidated cases for pretrial proceedings to keep
those cases for trials on liability as well.' 8 9 After a trial on
liability the Bill contemplates that the multidistrict court
that held the trial will return the case to the district court
in which the case had been filed for the damage award
proceedings. 90 The multidistrict court, however, would
retain an option to keep a case for a damage award upon a
finding that retention of the case for that purpose would
serve the interest of justice or the convenience of parties
or witnesses.' 9 ' This section also authorizes interlocutory
appeal of the multidistrict court's choice of law and liability rulings during a sixty day period. 92 After this time,
the multidistrict court may certify its liability findings and
intention to remand or keep the case for damage award
93
purposes.
Section 5 amends 28 U.S.C. § 1441 by granting defendants the ability to remove an action filed in state court to
federal court. 94 Section 5 envisions removal if the action
could have been brought under section 2 of the Bill, or if
defendant is a party to a case already pending under proposed U.S.C. § 1467 and the case arises out of the same
transaction or occurrence. 95 After removal of the case to
federal court for pretrial proceedings and liability determinations, this section calls for return of the case to the
96
state court in which it was filed for a damage award.
The same flexible finding as in section 4 of the Bill, "in
the interest of justice or for the convenience of parties
'

'" H.R. 3406, supra note 182, § 3.
'' Id. § 4.
Id.
191Id.
190

112

Id.

-,Id.
'" Id. § 5.
1'15 Id.
IN; Id.
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and witnesses," must accompany the return of the case to
97
state court. 1
Section 6 would add 28 U.S.C. § 1650 to guide federal
courts in their choice of law decisions for multiparty, multifora actions. 98 This section promulgates eleven factors
for federal multidistrict courts to consider in deciding
which jurisdiction's law to apply in conflicts of law holdings.' 99 These factors share many characteristics utilized
in modern choice of law methods in section 6 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts: location of conduct causing injury, interest of jurisdictions, domiciles of parties,
and fairness.2 0 0 This section eliminates the Erie-Klaxon
doctrine's mandate that a federal court in a diversity action must apply the choice of law rules of the state in
which it sits. 20 ' The choice of law section further allows
the multidistrict court to enter an order designating a single jurisdiction's law to govern all cases which have been
consolidated for adjudication by that court.2 °2 The section provides that one jurisdiction's law would govern all
issues, unless the multidistrict trial court specifically finds
otherwise in its choice of law order.20 3
The Bill ends with section 7, which revises service of
process for multidistrict litigation to ensure nationwide
service of process for actions brought under the revised
§ 1407.204 The Bill establishes the ability to subpoena
persons anywhere within the United States to appear for
the consolidated multidistrict cases.20 5 These practical aspects of the legislation guarantee that the multidistrict
1"1

Id.

"-8 Id. § 6.
1i" Id.
2- Restatement (Second) of Conflicts, § 6 (2) (1971). The Detroit case discusses
application of the Restatement (Second) factors to its facts. 750 F. Supp. at 798.
See supra note 93 for a discussion of the Restatement (Second) application to
choice of law problems.
20,See supra note 16 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Erie-Klaxon
doctrine.
202 H.R. 3406, supra note 182, § 6.
203
204

201

Id.
Id. § 7.
Id.
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courts will not have to formulate their orders on cold, impersonal records.
The ambition of the Bill is evident. At a minimum, it is
evidence that at least a few Congressmen are aware of the
judicial branch's mass tort- dilemma. The Bill examines
the available options and purports to make some policy
choices. Unfortunately, the Bill's flaws factored into its
failure to become law. These flaws deserve analysis.
The Bill's minimal diversity threshold of a single event
or occurrence which injures twenty-five people or more is
questionable. First, the twenty-five person threshold figure seems to be both arbitrary and problematic. Many accidents occur almost daily involving twenty-five people or
more. 20 6 Federal courts need not be concerned with each
of these situations. Even if an accident injures twenty-five
or more people, their individual suits do not necessarily
represent an overwhelming caseload for the courts.
Problems arise when the number of suits, not the number
of individuals bringing the cases, is high. °7
The Bill permits intervention as a right in a multidistrict
consolidated case if a party's claim arises out of the same
transaction or occurrence.20 8 Intervention can occur even
if that person ordinarily could not have brought the action
in federal court.2 0 9 This expansion of pendent jurisdiction could enable a party to intervene in the action of any
other party with a claim arising out of the mass tort
event. 21 0 This section potentially interferes in a prejudicial way with the rights of parties to the consolidated
cases. Such permissive intervention may be interpreted to
permit claimants with only tangential relationship to the
2Hearings on Multiparty, MultiforumjurisdictionAct of 1989, H.R. 3406 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Administration of Justice, of the House
Comm. on theJudiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) reprinted in 135 CONG. REC.
D 1374 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 1989) (statements of Sedler and Twerski and appendix
A to their statement) [hereinafter Hearings].
207 Id.
208 See supra note 187.
M. Id.
H
2 1( See Hearings, supra note 206, at 6.
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cases in which they intervene to proceed to adjudication
together. Giving the claimants the choice to intervene, instead of giving aggregation authority to a coordinating
authority such as the JPML, may not reach the desired efficiency goals. The intervention provision also seems superfluous since FRCP 24 and the related rule of joinder
ordinarily allow interested parties to intervene or to be
joined if necessary or desirable.1 t
The Bill's definitions merit close scrutiny. The definition of "a substantial part of the event or occurrence" is
important in many subsections of the Bill, but this definition provides no indication of the drafters' intent as to the
language's meaning or as to how a court should attempt
to interpret it. 21 2 The definition of "injury" includes only
physical harm or damage to persons or property.21 On
its face the statute lacks authority for multidistrict court to
hear emotional or psychological damage claims of injured
persons, despite the fact that a defendant's identical actions caused physical harm to one person and psychological damage only to persons seated in adjacent airplane
seats. The efficiency justifications of the Bill seem to indicate that both of these types of claims should be considered by the court which is familiar with the totality of the
accident.
The multidistrict litigation section of the Bill codifies
the current reality that the transferee court conducting
the multidistrict pretrial proceedings should also retain
these cases for liability determinations on common issues. 2 14 The flexible provision through which these multidistrict courts may also keep cases for damage awards
would promote uniformity and consistency. The interlocutory appeal of the choice of law and liability decisions of
the multidistrict court before it disposes of the cases for
damages awards would prevent waste of judicial re211

212

21.
214

See FED. R. Civ. P. 24, supra note 23.
H.R. 3406, supra note 182, § 2.
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
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sources. If errors of law have been made at the trial court
level, these mistakes can be corrected before more proceedings based on incorrect holdings take place.21 5
The Bill's removal section would function as an efficient
mechanism to remove cases to federal courts for nationwide adjudication of mass tort accident litigation.2 16 If defendants, who generally desire one convenient forum, can
gather all cases into one forum using minimal diversity,
the system will have taken a massive step toward eliminating the problem of repetitive individual lawsuits. Defendants usually are relatively small in number. Their ties to
the many cases might be the functional link needed to reel
in the web of the many state court cases. At the same
time, though, the advantages of removal hinge directly on
the defendant's cooperation with federal courts in centering the litigation into one forum. In some scenarios, however, defendants favor that their opponents be
dispersed. 1 7
The Bill's choice of law factors break no new ground in
aiding the federal courts in cases with multistate parties
and implications. The Bill conveys no indication of the
weight to be given any factor; therefore it effectively gives
no rule of decision.21 8 This section, however, abrogates
the federal courts' Erie-Klaxon duty to apply the choice of
law method of the state in which it sits to diversity
cases. 2
The action profits no one unless it includes a
uniform, predictable rule for federal courts' choice of law
determinations .220 The Bill's general presumption
against depecage will also make choice of law rules more
predictable, but the multidistrict courts may still adopt
See Report, 127 F.R.D., at 416.
H.R. 3406, supra note 182, § 5.
217 See Report, 127 F.R.D., at 420. See also Georgia Sargeant, ABA Rejects First
Proposed Mass-Tort Consolidation Plan; Second Plan Withdrawn, TRIAL, Apr. 1990, at
14, 16.
2 - H.R. 3406, supra note 182, § 6.
21" See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
2211 See Robert A. Sedler & Aaron Twerski, The Case Against All Encompassing Federal Mass Tort Legislation: Sacrifice Without Gain, 73 MARQ. L. REv. 76, 105 (1989).
21.

2-
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that principle if desired. 22
The Bill's final section specifically codifies the Van Dusen
v. Barrack rule for multidistrict courts.222 This section impacts multidistrict litigation when a case is transferred
back to a jurisdiction in which it was originally filed. 2
Nationwide service of process and subpoena capability
possess obvious practical value for the proper and expeditious resolution of the issues in dispute. 4
B. American Bar Association Commission on Mass Torts
Report
The American Bar Association (ABA) Commission on
Mass Torts (Commission) in August of 1989 reported to
the larger body of the ABA.225 In their report, the Commission suggested radical change for mass tort litigation.
The Commission synthesized its proposals into a draft
Federal Mass Tort Jurisdiction Reform Act (Act).226 In
the summer of 1990 the full body of the ABA rejected recommending the Act for congressional action.22 7
The essential provisions of the Act are as follow. First,
the Act establishes a federal judicial panel for mass
torts. 2 8 This body may act when at least 100 federal or
state civil tort actions alleging damages greater than
$50,000 arise from a single occurrence or series of occurrences.229 At that juncture, this new panel can transfer
some or all of the actions to a single federal district court
for resolution and trial of all issues. 230 The panel's powers would remain discretionary in much the same way as
Id.
H.R. 3406, supra notes 182. See supra notes 74-87 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the Van Dusen v. Barrack choice of law rule and its application in
the multidistrict setting.
H.R. 3406, supra note 182, § 4.
'221
222

22-

24

Id. § 7.

22s

See Sedler & Twerski, supra note 220, at 77.
Id. See also SARGEANT, supra note 217, at 16.
Sargeant, supra note 217, at 16.
H.R. 3406, supra note 182, § 2.

229

Id.

2.
2211

227

2311

Id.
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the JPML currently functions. 2 1' The transferee court
would then retain the right to decide which issues should
be consolidated for trial or remanded for individualized
resolution.
The Commission established the new federal judicial
panel for mass torts through the interstate commerce
clause of the Constitution, which gives Congress the
power to regulate commerce between the states. 3 2 The
Commission believed that Congress has the power to pass
a bill creating a judiciary panel with the ability to remove
state civil actions into federal court. The Act envisions
that federal courts will develop their own choice of law
rules for mass tort cases.233 The Act seeks application of
one state's law to govern all issues before the transferee
court. The federal courts would be free to formulate their
own choice of law rules to decide which state's law will
govern the issues in a case. 23 4 Though the proposal mentions depecage, the Act does not seem to seriously contemplate utilization of the doctrine for the process to
achieve the desired results of uniformity.
Other provisions allow federal courts to appoint impartial experts to survey the events giving rise to the mass
tort litigation.2 35 These experts can provide perspective
on the panorama before the court in an objective way.
The Act also mandates unitary assessment of a punitive
damage award, from which each plaintiff would receive a
share of a global punitive award. 3 6 Only one court or
jury will penalize defendants for gross or willful negligence with punitive damages.
The Act achieves laudable results. The federal judicial
2-'1 See supra notes 37-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the
JPML operates.
2'2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Article I of the Constitution grants Congess the
power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states.
Id.
'. Sedler & Twerski, supra note 220, at 78.
24 H.R. 3406, supra note 182, § 6.

2..
236

Id.
Id.
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panel for mass torts with the power to gather and transfer
related mass tort cases from federal and state courts for
complete adjudication will make great strides toward the
goals of uniformity and consistency. The new panel idea
emanates from the success of the current JPML. Expansion of the powers of the JPML allows many problems to
be solved. The discretion of this panel can be relied on to
facilitate mass tort litigation.
The Act's sections initiating unitary assessment of punitive damages also sharply improves upon the present system. For the first time, a multidistrict court with cases
consolidated from federal and state courts can punish
egregious tortfeasor conduct. This consolidated court
can act with the knowledge that its penalty will be the only
punitive damage award which can be gained against the
tortfeasor. The victims can be assured that the punitive
award will benefit each victim equally. The increase in
uniformity and predictability of damage awards will reduce the pressure for parties to hold out for better
settlements.
The Act's provision for appointment of experts by the
consolidated court to assist the court in the assessment of
tortfeasor conduct will aid the speedy and complete resolution of all claims. The overburdened court will have expert assistance in making sense of very technical issues. A
disinterested party can objectively evaluate the facts and
testimony of the many concerned parties much as a special master could.237 Since the plaintiff and defendant
each retain experts to help attorneys sift through their
cases, it seems only fair that a judge faced with hundreds
of cases should have the ability to retain experts of his
own.
C.

A Proposed Solution
Before embarking on an analysis of a proposed solution

2.7 FED. R. Civ. P. 53. Rule 53 defines a master as a "referee, auditor, examiner
[or] assessor." Id. § a. Only in exceptional circumstances will federal courts allow
masters. Id. § b.
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to simplify mass aviation tort litigation it is necessary to
keep the objectives clearly in mind. First, any changes
which would encourage quick settlements or early meaningful settlement negotiations between the parties should
be a top priority. Most cases of this type should settle and
therefore prevent the need for any court action. Also, an
added benefit from early settlement will be reduced transaction costs, which in turn translates into a greater percentage of the damage awards actually reaching the
victims.
Second, predictability in compensatory and punitive
damage awards is desperately needed. The uncertainty in
this area slows the settlement process immensely. In
many suits the wide range in potential defendant liability
prevents early settlements from both defendant and plaintiff points of view. Third, uniformity in damage awards
should also be achieved. The home state of a victim or
defendant should not be determinative of a victim's compensation or a defendant's liability. Finally, changes
should be made to promote the airline industry. Air
travel has become the most important mode of national
transportation. This situation demands that the industry
receive legal recognition appropriate to its status.
It is difficult to plot the proper course that the American legal system should follow regarding mass tort litigation. Since no comprehensive scheme currently exists, a
change of courts will upset nothing. Careful consideration must be given to understanding the needs of the aviation industry, the American public, and the legal system.
From that starting point, revision of the law regarding aviation torts can only improve.
This proposal consists of substantive and procedural
planks. Substantively, Congress should enact a statute
giving the federal courts jurisdiction over all aviation industry litigation, much like admiralty and maritime law.
Procedurally, federal courts must be given the ability to
gather cases into federal fora for global resolution of issues arising out of mass torts in general. These two pro-
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posals need not be integrated or implemented together;
either proposal alone would aid the federal judiciary's capacity to handle mass tort litigation. Operating in tandem, however, these proposals would significantly reduce
the obstacles facing the federal courts in dealing with
these issues.
1. Substantive Proposal
Aviation deserves the same legal framework that the
maritime industry enjoys. Congress vests the federal district courts with original jurisdiction over admiralty and
maritime claims. 23 Federal statutes and regulations gov23 9
ern all facets of the shipping and maritime industry.
The jurisdictional authority of the courts, in combination
with the federal statutes regulating the shipping industry,
guarantees the application of uniform rules of decision to
maritime disputes. Congressional expansion of aviation
law into an admiralty-like federal jurisdiction for aviationrelated disputes would expedite and streamline aviation
industry conflict resolution.
In the 1960s, Senator Tydings of Maryland introduced
several bills designed to create exclusive aviation jurisdiction for the federal courts. 240 His idea should be resurrected. The tremendous problems in aviation litigation
and predictions of trouble in the future which pressured
Senator Tydings to formulate his legislation have arrived.241 Congress should pattern a new bill creating aviation jurisdiction for the federal courts on the admiralty
law. A comparison between aviation law and admiralty
law shows the desirability of this course of action.
Admiralty owes its position in American legal history to
2- 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988).
2...

49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1988).

S. 3305, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 114 CONG. REC. 9436
(1968); S. 3306, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 114 CONG. REC. 9436-37
(1968); S. 4089, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 114 CONG. REC. 28616-19
(1968).
2.1
114 CONG. REc. 9435 (1968) (statement of Sen. Tydings).
24..
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the Constitution. 24 2 The framers of the Constitution gave

their only significant transportation system special legal
recognition. 24 3 Unfortunately, there is little record of the

framers' intent to confer admiralty jurisdiction on the federal judiciary because the Constitutional Congress' deliberations were secret and no contemporary records of the
proceedings exist.2 44 Historical research concludes, however, that the framers placed federal maritime jurisdiction
in the Constitution to correct a flaw of the Articles of Confederation: disuniformity in admiralty law.245
American courts put the framers' intention of uniformity into motion:
The [framers'] .

.

. purpose was .

.

. to place the entire

subject - its substantive as well as its procedural features
under national control because of its intimate relation
to navigation and to interstate and foreign commerce. In
pursuance of that purpose, the constitutional provision
was framed and adopted. Although containing no express
grant of legislative power over the substantive law, the
provision was regarded from the beginning as implicitly
investing such power in the United States. Commentators
took that view; Congress acted on it, and ...

this Court,

gave effect, to it. Practically, therefore the situation is as if
that view were written into the provision. After the Constitution went into effect, the substantive law theretofore
in force was not regarded as superseded or as being only
the law of the several [s]tates, but as having become the
242 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
The "judicial power of the United States"
extends to "all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." Id. §§ 1-2.
24-1 G. Robson Stewart, Comment, Overseas NationalAirways v. United States: Should
There Be Federal Common Law For Aviation Tort? 8 BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 183, 189
(1987).

244

DAVID W. ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM

7-8 (1970).

Id. at 15. The Articles of Confederation left admiralty jurisdiction to the
states. The plan for the Constitution submitted by Pinckney of South Carolina
corrected that flaw. Id. The Committee of Detail which wrote the draft copy that
was submitted to the Constitutional Convention worked the Pinckney plan into
their proposal. Id. at 10-14. The idea of federal maritime jurisdiction did not
originate solely in the Committee of Detail therefore, but that Committee was
responsible for the final language of the admiralty clause put into the Constitution. Id. The Framers believed that their transportation industry deserved national attention.
24.5
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law of the United States, subject to power in Congress to
alter, qualify or supplement it as experience or changing
conditions might require.246
Further, in The Lottawanna, the Supreme Court declared,
"The Constitution must have referred to a system of [admiralty] law coextensive with, and operating uniformly in,
the whole country. '2 47 Later Supreme Court decisions
such as Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen clarified that state statutes could not affect the uniformity of admiralty law even
in areas on the fringe of admiralty where the federal government remained dormant.248
In 1789, aviation did not exist. If it had, almost assuredly, the framers of the Constitution would have deemed
aviation as a subject which deserved national, instead of
state, supervision. Aviation arguably has more interstate
and national contacts than admiralty since even a landlocked state can be served by plane. Also, admiralty and
aviation share other similarities in technical and practical
operations. The captain of a plane or ship possesses extraordinary control of his craft. Each captain navigates using nautical miles. Although aviation lacks an evolution of
traditions from the medieval era, aviation still has international rules, respected and observed the world over.2 4 9 In
fact, much of aviation's commercial and navigational traditions are derived from admiralty law. At present aviation offers the most important and effective long distance
transportation system in the United States.
Panama Ry. Co. v.Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 386 (1924).
88 U.S. 558, 575 (1874).
24s 244 U.S. 204, 215-16 (1917).
In this case, the Supreme Court held that a
New York Workmen's Compensation Board could not award damages to a widow
whose husband was killed working on a ship at the Port of New York. Id. at 218,
The Court reasoned that the Constitution gave exclusive jurisdiction of admiralty
to the federal government, and if New York could subject all ships coming into
her ports to Workmen's Compensation liability, the uniformity sought by the
Constitution would be disrupted. Id. at 214-15, 217. The Court ruled that a state
program such as Workmen's Compensation disrupted uniformity even in areas on
the fringe of admiralty where Congress had not yet acted. Id. at 217-18.
24!,GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY chs. 1-5 (2d
ed. 1975).
246
247
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The federal government preempted the field of aviation
regulation long ago. JusticeJackson described the federal
preeminence in aviation more eloquently than could be
done here in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota:
Students of our legal evolution know how this Court interpreted the commerce clause of the Constitution to lift navigable waters of the United States out of local controls and
into the domain of federal control. Air as an element in
which to navigate is even more inevitably federalized by
the commerce clause than is navigable water. Local exactions and barriers to free transit in the air would neutralize
its indifference to space and its conquest of time.
Congress has recognized the national responsibility for
regulating air commerce. Federal control is intensive and
exclusive. Planes do not wander about in the sky like vagrant clouds. They move only by federal permission, subject to federal inspection, in the hands of federally
certified personnel and under an intricate system of federal commands. The moment a ship taxis onto a runway it
is caught up in an elaborate and detailed system of controls. It takes off only by instruction from the control
tower, it travels on prescribed beams, it may be diverted
from its intended landing, and it obeys signals and orders.
Its privileges, rights, and protection, so far as transit is
concerned, it owes to the Federal Government alone and
not to any state government.25 °
Congress reinforced the exclusive federal interest in aviation with the Federal Aviation Act of 1954.251 Today, federal statutes and regulations set standards which govern
even the smallest aspects of aviation.252 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) were created to ensure that
American aviation standards remain the world's safest.
Furthermore, like admiralty, aviation's commercial
transactions are heavily regulated by the federal government. The federal government monitors the financing of
2.- 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944) (citations omitted).
21
49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1988).
252
14 C.F.R. §§ 1-1200 (1991) (FAA, DOT and NTSB regulations).
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airplanes as well as ships.2 53 International treaties of
which the United States is a signatory cover shipment of
goods by water and by air.254 Finally, federal statutory law
already governs personal injury or wrongful death actions
which occur over the water in airplanes.25 5 An international treaty details the causes of action for injuries
aboard international airline flights.256 The postures of
aviation and admiralty in federal law mirror one another
in all but one respect: federal courts decide admiralty
claims with regard to federal law while the same courts
decide aviation cases under diversity jurisdiction's mosaic
of law, depecage 57
A constitutional amendment for exclusive federal jurisdiction for aviation law is unlikely. But nothing as radical
as a constitutional amendment is required to put this plan
into effect; Congress holds the power to act in this area.
The Supreme Court expressly recognized that this power
belongs to Congress pursuant to the Constitution's commerce clause in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland.258 Congress exercised its power to regulate
interstate commerce through passage of the Federal Aviation Act and its many provisions. 259 Thus, Congress
maintains the power to place aviation concerns within the
exclusive province of the federal courts.
The exact structure of federal legislation imposing fedCompare 46 U.S.C. §§ 1301-04 (1988) with 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1401-04 (1988).
Compare Carriage of Goods by Sea Treaty, International Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules relating to Bills of Lading, 51 Stat. 247, T.S. No. 931,
120 L.N.T.S. 157 (1937) and Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1936, 46 U.S.C.
app. 39 1300-1315 (1988) with Warsaw Convention, Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Int'l Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49
Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (1934), reprinted in 49 U.S.C. app.
§ 1502 (1988) and 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 81-124 (1988).
21- The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988); Federal Employers' Liability
Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988); Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1988); Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. app.
§§ 761-68 (1988).
2. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 254, at arts. 4-16, 18-26 (limitation of liability for goods in air transport).
2 7 See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of depecage.
2- 409 U.S. 249, 274 (1972).
219 See Veldenz, supra note 9, at 205.
2
2
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eral jurisdictional stature for aviation is beyond the scope
of this article. The jurisdictional lines which define admiralty jurisdiction, "on navigable water" geographically
and "admiralty-related" conceptually, could be analogized into workable formulations for use within aviation. 26 0 Any final draft of legislation must work out the
necessary compromises and accommodations with state
laws over the parameters of the new aviation jurisdiction.
Congress must specifically define which federal laws
would be preempted by this new law as well. 6 ' Just as
admiralty law has the savings clause of the Judiciary Act,
the new uniform aviation act legislation should make specific provision for any concurrent jurisdiction and retain
the right to trial inviolate where it would be so at common
law.262 The bill should also create a federal cause of action for aviation torts along with the aviation jurisdiction
so that reference to state law will be unnecessary. 63 The
courts could then fill in the interstices of a federal aviation
common law which are not clearly defined by statute from
the wealth of persuasive case law within admiralty.
A federal forum for the aviation industry would provide
several benefits. Perhaps one of the most important improvements would be the eradication of Conflicts of law
decisions in all domestic mass aviation litigation. Aviation-related litigation, from products liability to personal
injury, would be governed by one uniform law; federal
law. A uniform law would drastically increase predictability. If Congress decides not to create a federal common
law in this area, at the least it could specify how federal
courts should choose the state whose law will govern the
case. 2
The entire aviation industry and consumers
Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 249, 261.
See supra notes 254-56.
262 See 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988).
The statute states, "The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of: (1)Any civil
case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other
remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." Id.
2W
26

21,.

See Veldenz, supra note 9, at 205.

2-

Kastenmeier & Geyh, supra note 6, at 562-67.

708

JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE

[57

would benefit from the reduction of insurance and litigation costs. 265 With federal jurisdiction over aviation, the
JPML can function efficiently to bring cases together for
global resolution. A corollary result would be the unitary
assessment of punitive damages. Finally, if Congress allows aviation to borrow another admiralty concept, for
many disputes, a judge alone without a jury, would be the
trier of fact. 266 Such a procedure would greatly expedite
aviation cases.
Of course this new federal power deprives states, in the
abstract, of certain powers.2 6 7 The advocates who defend
states' rights to govern tortious conduct within their states
will oppose this proposal vigorously. 268 Congress should

ignore their obstructionist clamor. States under the present system of exclusive federal regulation of aviation control not one iota of airline or airplane or airport
regulation. Their sole interest is in the welfare of their
citizens. In the final analysis, their citizens would benefit
far more from uniform federal law in aviation than from
an abstract state's rights notion of federalism. The status
quo in which states "protect" their citizens' interest
causes immediate problems in those citizens' receipt of
compensation for tortious injury. In short, the policy
benefits far outweigh theoretical, conceptual problems of
loss of state rights in an area in which states' interests
26.1
266

See Veldenz, supra note 9, at 204 n.209.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 38(e). The Rule reads "(e) Admiralty and Maritime

Claims. These rules shall not be construed to create a right to trial by jury of the
issues in admiralty or maritime claim within the meaning of Rule 9(h)." Id. See
also FED. R. Civ. P. 9(h) Advisory Committee Notes on 1966 Amendment to Rules.
"One of the important procedural consequences is that in the civil action either
party may demand a jury trial, while in the suit in admiralty there is no right to
jury trial except as provided by statute." Id.
267 See U.S. CONST. amend. X. "All powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." Id. Students of American Constitutional law recognize that this is merely a truism. "The amendment states but a truism that all is
retained which has not been surrendered." United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,
123-24 (1941).
, 8 See Robert A. Sedler & Aaron Twerski, State Choice of Law in Mass Tort Cases: A
Response To A View From The Legislature, 73 MARQUETrE L. REV. 625, 628-36 (1990).
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were preempted decades ago.
An alternative substantive proposal for the new federal
aviation tort legislation is in order. Overall, a scheme in
which the airlines and aircraft operators concede to strict
liability for accidents in the process of air transport seems
appropriate. Many commentators suggest such a
scheme. 270 As noted previously many airlines propose
this sort of deal in settlement negotiations. 27 '
While this change appears radical, in reality, it is not.
Common carriers such as airlines currently are held to
strict highest care negligence standards of safe passage of
customers under current law.272 In return for this concession, airline passengers could relinquish claims for punitive damages. This compromise would exponentially
improve incentives to negotiate for both victims and the
airlines. Victims and their families would be assured of
full, complete and speedy compensation. Airlines would
be free from the uncertainty and unpredictability of sometimes multiple punitive damage awards. The airline industry would feel adequate pressure to maintain high
safety standards, and accident investigations could proceed unhampered by the need for liability determinations. 7 3 Victims and defendants would benefit from
reductions in transaction costs.
269 Compare Kastenmeier & Geyh, supra note 6, at 564-68 with Sedler & Twerksi,
supra note 268, at 632-38. The author obviously sides with Kastenmeier & Geyh
in this debate.
270 See Doo Hwan Kim, Some Considerations of the Draft For the Convention On An
Integrated System of Int'l Aviation Liability, 53 J. AIR L. & CoM. 764, 779-85 (1988);
Laurence Barron, Aircraft Accident Investigation - Whose Interest Prevails, 9 AIR L. 87,
91 (1984).
271 See supra note 107.
272 See Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp., 350 F. Supp. 612, 614 (C.D. Cal. 1972). The
Gabel court held that the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and related regulations
imposed a duty on defendant airline to perform with the highest degree of care.
Id. See also Federal Bills of Lading Act, 59 U.S.C. app. §§ 81-124 (1988).
27. See generally, Kennelly & Bosco, The National Transportation Safety Board - The
Right of Accident Victims to Participatein Investigations, 33 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 473, 532
(1989) (the fact that NTSB investigations determine liability in many cases distracts the agency from doing the best investigation possible - plaintiffs and defendants fight for input into the results).
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Procedure

At this time, the main procedural innovations to be implemented in mass torts should be mechanisms to gather
related mass tort cases into federal court. The plank of
the ABA Bill, which proposed creation of a new improved
mass tort panel much like the current JPML, should be
put into motion. The JPML's current success indicates
that with improved powers its abilities could help the system efficiently process mass tort litigation. The JPML's
power should be extended specifically to allow it to consolidate related mass tort state cases into a federal forum
at its discretion. Congress could invoke its power under
the Commerce Clause or its power to establish inferior
courts to make the new JPML a reality.274
Another gathering pathway might consist of judicial action. The Anti-Injunction Act (A-I Act) 275 prevents federal courts from enjoining state courts for federalism
reasons. Nevertheless judicially-created exceptions already mitigate this A-I Act's exceptions to permit the
transferee courts to enjoin state courts from proceedings
in related mass tort actions. This interpretation would
force the state plaintiffs to come to the federal system to
get relief and subject themselves to the JPML power to
consolidate cases. If plaintiffs have state claims closely
linked to their federal mass tort suits, the new pendent
jurisdiction legislation passed by Congress in January
1991 assures that these closely related state claims can be
heard in federal court if necessary. 76
274

See Sedler & Twerski, supra note 220, at 78.

28 U.S.C. 2283 (1988). The statute reads in pertinent part, "A court of the
United States may'not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court
except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." Id.
276 See Federal Courts Study Comm. Implementation Act of 1990, H.R. 5316,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) reprinted in 136 CONG. REC. H132297-13311 (daily
ed. Oct. 27, 1990); T.M. Mengler, S.B. Burbank & T.D. Rowe, Jr., Recent Federal
275

Court Legislation Made Some Noteworthy Changes, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 31, 1990, at 20. The

new legislation re-implements pendent jurisdiction for the federal courts, a procedure which had been gutted by the Supreme Court's decision in Finley v. United
States. Id. See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989). In Finley, the Supreme
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Once the cases can be consolidated in a useful fashion,
the transferee court should possess authority to meaningfully and carefully consider the issues on its mass torts
docket. The ABA Bill's proposal for experts to277
assist the
Specifappropriate.
seems
cases
the
surveying
in
judge
ically with regard to aviation, the current exclusion of
NTSB reports on airline crashes should be discontinued. 78 These federal agency conclusions in reports
should be fully admissible at trial to assist the judge. This
information is the best available. Fault determinations by
federal agencies carry tremendous weight with juries. At
the least, though, the agency personnel should be available to brief the judge at his request. The agency reports
or personnel could serve much like a special master under
FRCP 5 1.279
On an even more radical level of revision, the Congress
could create, under its Article I constitutional powers a
quasi-judicial arm of the FAA or NTSB. This board or
panel would determine fault or negligence in airline accidents. 280 From that decision, the board would make compensation awards to the victims of the accident. After all,
Court affirmed the dismissal of a widow's claim against the City of San Diego for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 556. The plaintiff sued the United States
in federal court under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Id. at 546. Federal courts
have exclusive jurisdiction over such suits. Id. at 547. When the widow impleaded the City as a co-defendant, the widow's cross-claim did not fall under
pendent or ancillary subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 556.
277 See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
278 See Report, 127 F.R.D., at 405; NTSB Faults United, GE in Iowa Crash, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Nov. 2, 1990, at A4.
2711 See FED. R. Civ. P. 53, supra note 238.
280 This board could make fault determinations and provide damage awards
much like either Workmen's Compensation Boards currently operate or the National Labor Relations Board currently operate. These boards fulfill administrative functions but make fully binding decisions on the parties before them. The
FAA or NTSB could make fault determinations following basically the same procedures already in place. See supra note 270. The NTSB could then make compensation findings for the victims. This process would tremendously speed up the
process of and lower the cost of compensation for victims. Administrative proposals to deal with mass torts problems are not wholly unusual. Recently such a
compensation board was proposed as a Congressional bill. Congress Approves Agent
Orange Bill, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 31, 1991, at A4.
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the multidistrict court in aviation crash proceedings already functions much as an administrative body.
Whether punitive damages are available under federal
common law or not, unitary assessment of punitive damages should be imposed immediately. With the ability of
gathering mechanisms to get all related cases into one forum for the first time procedurally, the tortfeasor can be
punished once and for all time in a punitive way. Airlines
benefit from this proposal because they are not subject to
multiple awards. Their benefit is tempered, though, since
the publicity nightmare of a huge punitive award arising
out of global resolution of a plane crash will be lasting.
The victims share in any punitive award on an equal basis.
The effect of consolidated trials and tag-along cases
could be addressed. A comprehensive plan to detail the
consequences of a consolidated trial on later cases should
be formulated by Congress or detailed by the Supreme
Court. Such a scheme could include some sort of limitations period beyond which claims for airline torts cannot
be filed. In cases where a transferee court schedules consolidated cases for exemplary trial with effects on all
cases, a procedure is needed whereby the trial court can
set a date beyond which if cases are not yet filed arising
out of the same accident or occurrence, the future cases
are bound to the effects of the consolidated trial's verdicts. In the peculiar circumstances of mass aviation tort
litigation all parties who are victims of a specific crash
could be notified quickly and easily to avoid due process
challenges. Premium court efficiency could then exist at a
consolidated trial.
Lastly, if federal common law is not adopted, federal
choice of law rules should be formulated for the federal
courts. 8 1 Some meaningful guidance must exist to make
these choice of law determinations. A Congressional debate designating the site of the crash or the home state or
the victim or defendant corporation's place of incorpora2.1

See supra note 264.
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tion as the state's law which should govern a mass tort
would be helpful. Another proposal is to let the law of the
jurisdiction in which the JPML's consolidated court sits
govern the issues before that court. This makes as much
sense as the current case law. From ajudicial perspective,
it also makes sense since an objective body, theJPML, can
make a decision on objective criteria - the convenience
and efficiency needs of a certain case. The decision of
which forum in which to consolidate the cases would also
carry the effect of determining that the law of that state
will be the law which will govern all issues of the mass tort
cases. Less characterization and self-interested manipulation is possible since differentjudges make the decision of
which law another judge will apply. An added advantage
will be that the transferee judge will be familiar with the
law to be applied. A settled choice of law method such as
this will greatly reduce uncertainty. The early choice of
law decision will also improve settlement incentives.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The field of mass torts in America is in turmoil. The
judicial system rapidly feels itself overwhelmed by the
tasks society imposes upon it.2a 2 While the current system
possesses valuable and durable qualities to deal with the
mass tort problem, the system is also shackled in many
respects. Congress and the courts must address that situation. This article attempts to propose concrete solutions
to the field of mass torts, with mass aviation torts at the
forefront. Aviation accidents provide a useful template
on which to begin to revise the entire mass tort litigation
process. Ideas and concepts unique to the aviation industry and its needs can be adapted quickly and effectively to
handle other problems. Perhaps every field within mass
torts can be handled in this individualistic way; certainly,
each field must receive the serious contemplation which
aviation mass torts garnered here.
2.2

See Hill & Baker, supra note 4, at 76-77.
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Because of its high profile nature and great economic
impact on this country and its economy, the law of aviation should be revised so that it can operate at an optimum level. The industry is in the midst of a troubled era.
The industry is rapidly becoming an oligopoly. 283 The
proposals above would improve the aviation industry's
ability to conduct litigation. With these changes the industry will be able to quickly rid itself of decades-long litigation and concentrate on safety and service.
This revision of the law of mass aviation torts is only a
small step toward revision of the entire mass torts arena.
But it is a beginning. Though progress may be piecemeal,
it must happen step by step. On the seashore where appropriately the land and sea and sky come together a
short story demonstrates the importance of continually
trying to effect change appropriate for the legal system. A
man and his grandson were walking along the beach.
Each time the little boy saw a starfish washed up on the
shore, he picked it up and tossed it back into the ocean.
When the grandfather inquired as to why, the boy replied,
"If I don't pick them up and throw them back they will dry
up and die. I'm saving their lives." The grandfather harrumphed, "What are you doing? There are thousands of
starfish ahead and many miles of beaches. What you are
doing won't make any difference." The boy picked up another starfish as they continued to walk and gently threw
it into the sea. "Yes, that's true," he said, "but it makes a
difference to this one."
Indeed, if a seemingly insurmountable problem is regarded as too large to solve, that is the way it will remain.
Though the mass torts dilemma facing the nation's courts
poses difficult challenges, many different angles should be
examined in an attempt to solve the problem. Each victim
or party who benefits from the revision of the mass aviation tort system will appreciate the difference.
See Louis Uchitelle, Off Course - What Happened To America's Airlines?, N.Y.
Sept. 1, 1991, at 12; Fly the Lucrative Skies of United American Delta,
Bus. WK., Oct. 14, 1991, at 90.
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